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Abstract
This thesis compares insurance premium principles with current nancial risk para-
digms and uses distorted probabilities, a recent development in premium principle
literature, to synthesize the current models for nancial risk measures in banking
and insurance. This work attempts to broaden the denition of value-at-risk beyond
the percentile measures. Examples are used to show how the percentile measure
fails to give consistent results, and how it can be manipulated. A new class of
consistent risk measures is investigated.
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This dissertation studies risk measures for capital requirements. The insuciency
of the current methods is illustrated and a new set of risk measures is proposed.
Chapter 1 motivates the valuation of a capital requirement, gives denitions for
risk and risk measure and uses the premium principle literature to dene proper-
ties that are desirable in a risk measure. Chapter 2 discusses risk measures that are
currently used for capital requirements; illustrates their inconsistencies and consid-
ers solutions that have been proposed in recent literature. Chapter 3 investigates a
new set of distorted risk measures, illustrates how they can improve upon the risk
measures discussed in Chapter 2. Two special cases of the new risk measure are
considered in depth. Chapter 4 generalizes the two special cases from Chapter 3
and studies this larger set and attempts to determine parameters appropriate for
capital requirements. Chapter 5 applies the risk measures from Chapters 3 and
4 to topical problems in insurance. Chapter 6 summarizes the results and pro-
poses problems for future research. Portions of this work have been published in
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the North American Actuarial Journal (Wirch, 1999) and have been accepted for
publication in Insurance: Mathematics and Economics (Wirch and Hardy, 2000).
1.1 Motivation
Over the past decade there has been an increased incidence of insurance insolvency.
In the case of Confederation Life (McQueen, 1996), the most recent of the insol-
vencies, a large part of the blame falls on the lack of diversication of risk. As
much as 60% of Confederation Life's asset portfolio was exposed to changes in real
estate prices. When real estate prices fell, this exposure was too great from which
to recover. Since then, modeling risk and determining appropriate levels of capital
have become of increased signicance for actuaries and insurance regulators.
One focus of this attention is on answering the question: how should we mea-
sure risk? The goal for nancial regulators is to nd a methodology for measuring
risk that is simple to implement and understand, yet is able to accurately compare
divisions within a rm as well as between dierent corporations, and which makes
the risks of each company transparent to the risk holders, including shareholders,
debtors, owners, policyholders, employees and potential investors.
In insurance, asset portfolios are allocated to funds in an attempt to match
assets and liabilities. The premiums from an insurance liability, say a ten-year en-
dowment insurance, are invested in assets that are often matched in duration to the
estimated duration of the liabilities (10 years) with some allowance for surrenders.
The premiums are calculated based on an assumed mortality table and interest
rate model. For ten-year term insurance, premiums might be invested in assets of
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varying duration, so that they match the benet payments required, based on an
assumed mortality table, lapse table and interest rate model.
In banking, risk measures are traditionally used to analyze asset portfolios
without reference to liabilities. Assets such as stocks, bonds, loans and mortgages
are held by the bank using deposits from individuals and corporations. The risk
from these investments is initially borne by the bank; however, the rate of interest
earned on the deposits uctuates based on the returns earned by the bank. The
majority of liabilities, not including deposits, are cleared through the bank, so that
the bank holds no risk. For example, bonds and T-bills, with xed or oating
rates of return, are sold through the bank by a corporation or government, and
the investment risk is born by the individual or corporation investing in these
instruments. Mutual funds sold by a bank are pools of individuals' investments,
invested by the bank into stocks and bonds that determine the return earned on
the fund, thus the full risk is born by the investor. Thus the traditional risks that
banks were concerned with relate predominantly to their assets, and risk measures
relating to fund performance and asset management are of key importance.
Over the past decade, corporations have been investing more often in deriva-
tive products to hedge risk. Banks assuming these derivative products may not be
able to nd an investor to take the opposite position in order to clear the risk, and
may hold the risk themselves, hedged by selling a set of assets/liabilities that repli-
cate the opposite position as best they can. In this case, the derivative may not be
completely matched, and the risk of both positions should be evaluated. To hedge
the risk in the derivative, the bank might have to assume an interest rate model,
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a credit risk model for the corporation, and a stock return model. Based on these
assumptions, they then invest in a hedged position that matches the risk in the
derivative. The nancial instruments used in this example may be a combination
of assets and liabilities that are directly linked to each other. Using the tradi-
tional approach to managing risk by focusing on managing the risk in the assets by
themselves does not take this into account and may increase the risk overall.
Similarly, over the past decade, insurers have used derivatives to hedge some
of the risks, especially interest rate risk, inherent in their liabilities, and have sold
products containing options and guarantees, which complicate their assets and lia-
bilities.
In light of these changes, and the growing complexity of the assets and lia-
bilities in banking and insurance, the risk measures that have been traditionally
used must evolve, and overall risk measures that encompass the whole company or
nancial conglomerate will have to be implemented.
1.2 Risk
Before a risk measurement system can be introduced, it is imperative to know
the basic unit to which it will be applied. A risk may be dened as an exposure
to events that may cause economic loss; the risk may be one bond, a portfolio
of assets and liabilities, or an entire rm. The exposure events are a subset of
the possible outcomes of the world and may include variables such as economic
indicators, prices of goods, services and nancial instruments as well as sociological
and environmental indicators.
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In this thesis, it is assumed that all risks have been specied, and that the set
of events that will cause economic loss are known.
Let X(!) be a random variable dened on the probability space (
; P; F ) and let
X0 be its non-random initial value.
Dene the set of events, L, as the set of losses, such that,
L = f!kX(!) < X0; ! 2 
g:
Similarly dene the set of gains, G, as,
G = f!kX(!)  X0; ! 2 
g:
What is unknown is which event will occur; however, based on this information, a
distribution for the change in portfolio value can be determined. The distribution
for the change in portfolio value can be referred to as the gain distribution, where
positive values pertain to gains and negative values pertain to losses. The gain
distribution is often used in economics or nance. The negative of this distribution
is called the loss distribution, or the risk distribution, where positive values pertain
to losses and negative values pertain to gains. Actuaries predominantly use the
loss distribution. It is important to identify whether we are analyzing the loss
distribution or the gain distribution, and unless otherwise stated, we will use the
loss distribution.
The risks considered in this paper are meant to be general. The main appli-
cations are to the investment portfolios of insurance companies, banks, securities
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rms, trading houses and other investment companies. The main dierence be-
tween insurance portfolios and other investment rm portfolios is that insurance
companies tend to invest in assets that match their liabilities, or hedge a liability
risk. They are not generally very concerned about day-to-day uctuations in the
value of their asset portfolio, but focus on much longer time scales, and only have to
prove solvency to regulators once or twice a year. Investment rms tend to engage
in more speculative investments, and have more onerous regulatory requirements;
thus, they are much more concerned with day to day changes. With the increased
demutualization of insurance companies and the progressive amalgamation of the
insurance and banking industries, the regulatory requirements for the insurance
industry may veer towards that of the banking industry. We consider applications
in both industries.
1.3 Risk Measure
The importance of a risk measure is in its ability to dierentiate between dierent
types of risk, its ability to accurately and consistently compare the severity of
dierent risk portfolios, and its ability to be easily understood and applied. Risk
measures are usually described in terms of positive numbers which relate to the
magnitude of a potential loss, or amount that should be held to cover a risk. The
application of a risk measurement technique should be general. Risk values can be
used in areas, such as: in the evaluation of investment risk, in the identication
of the optimal capital allocation, in the development and evaluation of portfolio
strategies, in the measurement of the quality of a portfolio, or in the evaluation
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of portfolio managers. Unfortunately, the same risk measurement technique may
not be appropriate for all the above applications. For example, a risk measure that
rewards conservatism may not be appropriate to evaluate portfolio managers of an
aggressive fund, but it may be useful for an investor evaluating the fund.
1.4 Review of Premium Principles
In this section, we draw on the literature of premium principles. Insurance pre-
mium principles result from the assumption that random claims can be funded by
series of xed payments, where the actual claims experience is considered to be the
realization of a `known' stochastic model (Goovaerts, DeVylder and Haezendonck,
1984). The insurance risk can be described as a non-negative real-valued random
variable, X, which represents the claims, or random losses that may occur, and a
premium principle is a rule,  that assigns a non-negative number to the insurance
risk X, which represents the initial capital that needs to be held to cover the risk.
 : X ! [0;1]
A set of axioms has been proposed in Goovaerts et al. (1984) to dene useful
premium principles; Wang (1995c) lists other characteristics and properties that
are often desirable for a premium principle. Similar sets of axioms and lists of
characteristics can be found in van Heerwaarden (1991), Kaas et al. (1994) and
Gerber (1979). We are interested in extending these criteria to general risk measures
and identifying whether these characteristics are relevant for investment portfolios.
1.4. REVIEW OF PREMIUM PRINCIPLES 8
Premium principles in the insurance industry are formulae which attempt to
calculate the appropriate price to transfer a risk. Premiums are often set with the
knowledge that there will be a large pool of independent diversiable risks with
similar characteristics. The central limit theorem can be used to get an accurate
estimate of the average cost and standard error for the average risk. This is dierent
from risk measures that attempt to measure how much capital should be placed
into safe and fairly liquid investments in order to cover potential losses; there is
a limited amount of pooling of small risks in an asset portfolio (risk pooling may
occur more often in the case of credit risk). However, premium principles and risk
measures share many of the same characteristics and many theoretical properties
that dene a good premium principle can also be applied to dene a good risk
measure. As well, an initial single premium may be considered the time-zero risk
measure from the point of view of the company, though economic pricing issues will
also be important.
General risk random variables can take values in the extended real numbers.
Artzner et al. (1997) state that the size of possible gains should be irrelevant for a
consistent risk measure and therefore a loss distribution left-censored at zero should
be used to value the risk for the full loss distribution. This idea is simple when
discussed in terms of a capital requirement. If you have a gain of $G, no capital will
be required since there is no loss. However, if you have a loss of $L, you will need
capital of $L to pay o the loss. Thus the capital requirement for this risk is $0 with
probability Pr(gain) and the capital requirement is positive with Pr(loss). Even if
the amount of the gain was much greater than the amount of the loss, the capital
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requirement would stay the same, thus we use a loss distribution left-censored at
zero to calculate the risk in a portfolio. Using the censored loss distribution, it is
possible to directly apply insurance premium principles to measure more general
risks.
Denote the risk measure for loss X as (X) 2 R. Goovaerts et al. (1984) list
a set of properties that should hold for a useful premium principle, (X):
A1. No unjustied premium (certain gain):
(X)  max(X) (1.1)
A2. Non-negative Risk Loading:
E[X]  (X) (1.2)
A3. Scale Invariant:
(aX) = a(X); for constant a  0 (1.3)
A4. Translation invariant:
(X + b) = (X) + b; for constant b  0 (1.4)
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A5. Subadditive:
(X + Y )  (X) + (Y ); where Y is an arbitrary loss random variable.
(1.5)
Property A3 ensures that a change in currency does not aect the risk measure.
Property A4 ensures that a degenerate risk (specied loss with probability 1) has
a premium equal to its certain loss. Often properties A3 and A4 are combined to
give a linearity property (aX + b) = a(X) + b. Property A5 ensures that there is
no incentive to split the risk into smaller risks.
At this point, it is illustrative to show that the translation invariant property
does not hold generally for the loss distribution, but only applies to censored loss
distributions. Consider portfolio X which has loss distribution Uniform[ 1; 1].
The distribution of the loss censored at zero is given by X+ = max(0;X)
Pr(X+ = 0) = 1
2




; for 0 < u  1:
In other words, X+ is 0 with probability 1
2
, or Uniform[0; 1] with probability 1
2
.
If we add a degenerate loss Y = 1
2
to the uncensored risk X, the loss distribution
is,
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and the censored loss distribution of X + Y is
[X + Y ]+ = max(0;X + Y ) 
8><
>:
Pr([X + Y ]+ = 0) = 1
4




; for 0 < u  3
2
:
In other words, [X+Y ]+ is 0 with probability 1
4





, which does not have the translation invariant property. However, if Y = 1
2
is
added to the censored risk X+ the loss distribution is non-negative,
X
+ + Y = max(0;X) + Y 
8><
>:












< u  3
2
:
which does follow the translation invariant property.
In adding a risk to a portfolio, it seems intuitive that the risk would be added
to the portfolio before censoring the portfolio loss distribution. This will not lead
to translation invariance. Thus there is still some debate over whether to use
the whole loss distribution or the censored loss distribution. Using the censored
distribution also leads to discrepancies between time zero pricing of risks and risk
measures. Although these two values serve very dierent purposes, there should be
some reconciliation between the two.
Other properties listed in Goovaerts et al. (1994) and Wang (1995c), that are
often useful for premium calculations are:
Let X and Y be random variables dened on 
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B1. Iterativity (Goovaerts, DeVylder and Haezendonck, 1984):
(X) = ((XjY )); (1.6)
where XjY is a conditional distribution, and Y is an observable random
variable.
B2. Multiplicativity: If X;Y are independent, then
(XY ) = (X)(Y ): (1.7)
B3. Comonotonicity(Wang, 1996c): If X and Y are comonotonic, then for any
pair of outcomes, t1 and t2,
[X(t1) X(t2)][Y (t1)  Y (t2)]  0 (1.8)
and (X + Y ) = (X) + (Y ): (1.9)
B4. Layer Additivity (Wang, 1996b): Given a partition of the domain of X,
f(xi; xi+1]; i = 0; 1; 2; :::g; 0 = x0 < x1 < x2 < :::; (1.10)
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0 for all x < xi
x  xi for all xi  x < xi+1
xi+1   xi for all xi+1  x
(1.11)






B5. Decreasing Absolute Risk Load (Wang, 1996b):
For y < x and constant h,
(I(x;x+h])  (I(y;y+h]): (1.13)






is an increasing function in x.
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is also an increasing function in x.
Iterativity suggests a possible method for obtaining marginal risk measures.
Multiplicativity parallels the property that E[XY ] = E[X]E[Y ] for independent
risks X;Y . Layer Additivity has applications in stop loss insurance and reinsur-
ance, and is implied for comonotonic risk measures. Decreasing Absolute Risk Load
provides that the absolute risk loading decreases at upper layers. Increasing Rela-
tive Risk Load ensures that higher levels have greater risk loading relative to the
mean loss for that layer.
There are many properties of premium principles which help with the ordering
of risks. X  Y denotes that X is less risky than Y , and usually pertains to
a specic type of ordering such as those listed below (C1-C4). For example a
premium principle  satises a specied risk order if X  Y implies that (X) <
(Y ). Given that FX(x) is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of X then
SX(x) = 1   FX(x) is the decumulative distribution function (ddf) of X, some
ordering properties are dened below:
C1. First Order Stochastic Dominance (Goovaerts, DeVylder and Haezen-
donck, 1984): If SX(t)  SY (t) for all t  0 then (X)  (Y ). (Note: There
are many other equivalent conditions. (Wang, 1998))
C2. Ordering of dangerousness (Goovaerts, DeVylder and Haezendonck, 1984):
If E[X] < E[Y ] <1 and there is a constant  such that FX(t)  FY (t) for
t <  and FX(t)  FY (t) for t   then (X) < (Y ).
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for all x  0, with strict inequality for some x 2 (0; 1) then (X) < (Y ).
(Note: There are many other equivalent conditions such as net stop-loss or-
dering. (Wang, 1998))
C4. Consistent partial ordering (Goovaerts, DeVylder and Haezendonck, 1984):




> 0g, then for any  2 A; (X)  (Y ).
The denition for the ordering of dangerousness, is referred to as the once
crossing rule, and relates to second order stochastic dominance by the following
proposition from Muller (1996):
Proposition 1.4.1 X precedes Y (denoted by X SSD Y ) in second stochastic
order if, and only if, there exists a sequence of decumulative distribution functions
(ddf) fS1; S2; :::g such that,
 S1 = SX
 The means for this sequence of ddfs are non-decreasing and converge to E(Y ).
 Si and Si+1 cross once: there exists ti such that
Si(t)  Si+1 for t < ti;
Si(t)  Si+1 for t  ti:
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 SY (t) = lim
i!1
Si(t).
Thus, it is sucient to show that
1. E[X]  E[Y ], and
2. There exists a once crossing point t0 such that
SX(t)  SY (t) for t < t0
SX(t)  SY (t) for t  t0;
for X SSD Y .
Second order stochastic dominance (SSD) has become a common standard for re-
lating risks, and is equivalent to net stop-loss ordering (Wang, 1996b).
A list of traditional premium principles is given below. Based on a loss dis-
tribution for loss random variable X, an equation for the premium, (X), is given
for each premium principle (Goovaerts, DeVylder and Haezendonck, 1984):
D1. Expected Value principle: (X) = (1 + a)E[X]; a  0.
D2. Maximum loss principle: (X) = aE[X] + (1  a)max(X); 0  a  1.
D3. Generalized Percentile Principle: (X) = aE[X] + (1  a)r;
r = minfrjFX(r)  1   g; 0  a  1.
D4. Variance principle: (X) = E[X] + a2X; a  0.
D5. Standard Deviation Principle: (X) = E[X] + aX; a  0.
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(x  E[X])2dFX(x); 0 < a  1.
D7. Exponential Principle: (X) = 1
a
logfE(eaX)g; a > 0.
D8. Mean value principle: u((X)) = E[u(X)], for any strictly increasing,
concave function u.
D9. Zero-Utility Principle: E[u(W + (X)   X)] = E[u(W )], for any strictly
increasing, concave function u, where W is the initial wealth of the insurer.
D10. Swiss Principle: E[u(X   a(X))] = u((1  a)(X)), for any strictly
increasing, concave function u, 0 < a  1.
D11. Orlicz principle: E[( X
(x)
)] = (1); for any continuous increasing,
convex .
D12. Dutch Principle: (X) = E[X] + aE[(X   E[X])+];   1; a  1:
D13. Esscher Principle: (X) = E[XeaX]=E[eaX]; a  0.
Each of the above principles either does not follow all of properties A1-A5,
or have a property that would limit its range of application as a risk measure. D1
only depends upon the expected value which is not translation invariant, and gives
an unjustied premium for degenerate risks. If the loss distribution is unbounded,
D2 is either innite or gives the expected loss. D3 will be shown to allow super-
additivity (see Example 2.2.3). D4, D6, D7, D8, D9, D10, D11 and D13 do not
allow both proportional and translation invariance. D4 and D5 do not exist if the
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second moment of the distribution does not exist. D12 has a maximum relative
risk loading of 100%.
Although the purpose of a nancial risk measure is not the same as the purpose
of an insurance premium principle, there are many similarities in the risks involved.
In both cases, it is important to realize that the size of possible positive outcomes
(the net of premium income less claims in the case of (re)insurance, or gains in the
case of an asset portfolio) is often irrelevant; however, the probability of obtaining
a positive outcome is relevant. Since the eects of a negative outcome are the main
concern, nancial risk measures often consider all gains to be zero losses. This
makes the nancial risk similar to the risk of the insurance provider who does not
participate in the gains of their clients, beyond the set premium.
The set of properties A1-A5 for a useful premium principle has recently been
applied to nancial risk measures. Artzner (1999) adapted these principles to dene
a coherent risk measure.
Denition 1.4.1 Consider two arbitrary risks X and Y. A risk measure  is called
a coherent risk measure if it satises the following characteristics:
A1, A2. A risk measure should be bounded above by the maximal loss, and bounded
below by the expected value of the loss: E[X]  (X)  max(X):
A3. A risk measure should be scale invariant: (aX) = a (X); a  0:
A4. A risk measure should be scalar additive(translativity):
(X + b) = (X) + b; b  0,
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and a degenerate risk should have a risk measure equal to its certain loss:
If Pr(X = b) = 1; then (X) = b; b  0:
A5. A risk measure should be sub-additive, so that there is no motivation to divide
the risk: (X + Y )  (X) + (Y ):
The characteristics of a premium principle determine its usefulness. Many
authors consider a set of rules, analyze the traditional principles based on these
rules, and often develop new principles which follow these rules. Deprez and Gerber
(1985) consider convex premium principles that are invariant under translation, and
show that the principles are sub-additive if and only if the premium principle is
also proportional, ie. (aX) = a (X); a  0.
Artzner et al. use their denition of a coherent risk measure to identify weak-
nesses in current risk measures and propose a new risk measure, using a conditional
expectation, which will be discussed later in Section 2.5.
Wang (1995a) uses a similar set of properties for risk premiums, and proposes
a new family of premium principles using distorted probabilities. These will also
be discussed later in this paper. Wang, Young and Panjer (1997) use this same set
of properties with an extra criterion which results in a unique distorted premium
principle.
Chapter 2
Problems with Current Risk
Measures
In this chapter, current capital requirement risk measures are investigated using the
coherency properties. Examples are used to illustrate where these risk measures
fail to give consistent results. Possible solutions that have been proposed in recent
literature are studied and applied to four two-parameter distributions.
2.1 Short Review of Value-at-Risk
The phrase `Value-at-Risk' (VaR) has become synonymous with the percentile risk
measure (Due and Pan, 1997; Morgan, 1995; Hull, 1997), which is identical to the
percentile premium principle, D3 on page 16 with a = 0. The typical VaR measure
uses a loss distribution for daily changes to the risk and the 95th or 99th percentile.
Generally, for a portfolio P , and an associated n-day loss random variable Ln, the
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 percentile-VaR, or V(P ), can be determined by solving the following equation
(Due and Pan, 1997):
Pr(Ln  V(P )) = : (2.1)
In this thesis, the percentile denition of the value-at-risk will always be referred
to as the percentile-VaR.
The percentile-VaR risk measure has gained a lot of attention over the past
decade. Increased activity of banks in the derivatives markets and the rate at which
these markets are expanding, becoming global and more complex, has stimulated
concern over the risk management practices used in banks and other nancial insti-
tutions. The Basel Capital Accord (Basel Committee, 1999), rst drafted in 1988,
proposed a set of international capital requirements for banks and other nancial
investment rms based on the inherent volatility of their individual assets, and
accounting mostly for credit risk. The requirements were determined separately
for each asset, using the risk-based capital approach of multiplying the nominal
value of each type of asset by a capital charge or default rate. Then the capital
requirements for each asset type were added together to obtain the capital require-
ment of the portfolio. This method did not permit reduced capital requirements
for hedged portfolios. In the 1993 revision of the Accord, a standard model for the
evaluation of the capital requirement computed the capital requirement, using the
percentile-VaR measure applied to modeled or simulated distributions for each of
four risks: interest rate risk, exchange rate risk, commodity risk and equity risk, and
summed across the four categories to obtain the nal capital requirement. Unfortu-
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nately, this method did not permit a reduction in capital requirements for diversied
portfolios, but allowed some reduction for hedged portfolios. To account for the
sub-additivity of diversied or hedged risks, the 1995 revisions allowed the use of
computer models to calculate the daily risk of a portfolio using the percentile-VaR,
as long as the models complied with Commission standards. The capital require-
ment, which is supposed to cover a ten-day period, is calculated at three times
the percentile VaR measure. The ten-day period is considered to be a reasonable
period over which it is possible to make a signicant change in a corporate port-
folio. This percentile-VaR measure was intended to be an appropriate amount to
cover most losses that could occur in a portfolio of assets due to adverse changes
in any of these four risks before the investment strategy could be revised and im-
plemented. The Basel rules came into eect in 1998. A revised capital adequacy
framework has been proposed in 1999 by the Basel Committee, which promotes
the development of internal capital assessment processes by bank management and
a more comprehensive approach to addressing risk including operational, liquidity,
legal and reputational risk as well as the current focus on credit and interest rate
risk (Basel Committee 1999).
In Europe, capital adequacy requirements have moved toward a common rule.
The European Union's Investment Services Directive allows rms based in one EU
country to do business in any other EU country. As well, the Capital Adequacy Di-
rective(CAD), published in 1993, provides Europe-wide capital requirements which
were similar to those of the 1993 Basel Accord revisions. More recent revisions allow
the use of in-house models for risk calculations and also use percentile-VaR mea-
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sures. The CAD guidelines were put into eect in 1996 for all banks and security
rms.
Risk-based capital (RBC) methods are currently used in Canada (Minimum
Continuing Capital and Surplus Requirements) and the United States to calculate
minimum capital requirements for insurers. Capital margins are calculated inde-
pendently for each type of asset within each type of risk based on ad hoc capital
charges which are multiplied by the nominal value of assets. The four main types
of risk are: C1 - Asset Risk, C2 - Underwriting Risk, C3 - Interest Rate Risk, and
C4 - Other Risks. The margins are combined using formulae specic to the type
of insurer that have been derived to allow for some correlation between risk types.
The capital charges for life insurers are slightly dierent from the capital charges
for casualty insurers, due to the nature of their assets and liabilities; however both
suggest dynamic nancial analysis or cashow testing to validate the adequacy of
the capital requirement.
Percentile-VaR is predominantly used in determining the capital requirements
for C1 or asset risk, for which a loss distribution can be modeled objectively; it may
be signicantly dierent between insurers, depending on their investment strategy
and management philosophy. In contrast, the RBC capital charges are usually based
on credit rating of the assets, and are determined independently of any specic asset
portfolio by the regulators.
The usual percentile-VaR denition for the value-at-risk reduces the informa-
tion in the loss distribution to one number, or possibly a few numbers, and the user
loses much of the information needed to fully understand the risk of the portfolio.
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Using this measure for one portfolio will give very simple, easily interpreted results:
For a risk X, V:95(X) is the value that represents a division in the loss distribution
of X. There is a 95% chance that the loss will be less than this amount, and a
5% chance that the loss will be larger than this amount (subject to an accurate
assessment of the loss distribution). Thus, there is a 95% probability that the
percentile-VaR is sucient, subject to model error.
The methodologies for calculating VaR take into consideration market factors,
such as domestic and foreign interest rate structures, exchange rates, stock prices
and ination rates, which are examples of risk factors that may have an impact on
the nancial risks of a portfolio. There are many methods which use these market
factors to determine the distribution of Ln. These methods can be classied into
three model types: the historical model, the analytic model and the simulation
model. Each of these methods determines a distribution for changes to the portfolio
value. Below we outline how the percentile-VaR measure can be used with each
method.
Historical Model: In the historical approach, using a one day holding pe-
riod, previous one day uctuations (typically using daily data for the last 10 years)
in market factors are used to model possible uctuations to current market factor
values. Alternative prot/loss realizations are valued based on these uctuations
and a distribution for prot/loss can be obtained from these realizations to produce
a condence interval. The algorithm is:
Let Fd = (f(1;d); f(2;d); :::; f(k;d)) the vector of observed risk factor values
on day d, where d = 0; 1; :::; n, n = number of days used;
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P (F ) = the value of a portfolio, using the factor values F ;
F0 = today's risk factor values;
Fd = Fd   Fd 1 are one-day factor changes;
P0 = P (F0) Initial value of the portfolio;
Pd = P (F0 +Fd);
Order the Pd's to get fP(d)gnd=1, where P(d+1)  P(d);
Assign equal probability to each observed factor change;
Then, V(P0) = P0   P(n):
Simulation Model: An alternative method, using simulation, requires a dis-
tribution for changes in each market factor, including correlations between factors.
Normal and lognormal distributions are often used, with correlations derived from
historical data. Given distributions for each of the risk factors, Monte Carlo simu-
lation is used to obtain simulated changes in the market factors, which are used to
obtain a prot/loss distribution and condence intervals in the same way as in the
historical method, using the algorithm:
Obtain the joint density function of the risk factors F = (f1; f2; :::; fk);
Let n be number of simulations;
Simulate n vectors fFjgnj=1;
Calculate fPjgnj=1, the value of the portfolio for factor values fFjgnj=1;
Order the Pj 's to get fP(j)gnj=1, where P(j+1)  P(j);
Let P0 = the initial value of the portfolio.
Then, V(P0) = P0   P(n).
Analytic/Variance-Covariance Model: A more restrictive approach, the
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analytic method, decomposes the portfolio into elemental instruments each of which
is exposed to only one market factor. A set of distributions for changes in the market
factors is used to calculate the VaR and the portfolio variance. Since the portfolio
is the sum of the elemental instruments, if the market factors have a multivariate
normal distribution, then the portfolio is also normally distributed. The algorithm
for this model is as follows:
Let the random variables Pf1 ; Pf2 ; :::; Pfk be the decomposition of Port-






Assuming that the component securities are related through a known
covariance structure, using the multivariate normal distribution, the
portfolio distribution can be calculated, and V(P0) obtained from the
distribution.
Even though these models seem intuitively reasonable and they are easy to
explain, their tractability is based on the assumption that the percentile-VaR mea-
sure is sub-additive. Unfortunately, it is possible to show that percentile-VaR, as
with all percentile measures, can be super-additive (see Example 2.2.3). There are
simple examples that reveal the inconsistencies of the percentile-VaR, some of these
are illustrated in the next section.
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2.2 The Inconsistencies of VaR
Using the ve basic properties for coherent premium principles, it is easy to show
that percentile-VaR satises properties A1 and A4.
For A1: Let L be a loss random variable censored from below at zero, where
max(L)  0 is the maximum loss. For 0    1, we have that V(L) is a
increasing function of , and thus obtains its maximum when  = 1, thus
V(L)  V1(L) = max(L): (2.2)
For A4: Given some arbitrary , and some constant b > 0, using the same loss
random variable L, we know that
Pr(L  V(L)) = : (2.3)
Now, dene a new loss random variable Y = L+b, then we want to determine
x = V(Y ) so that
Pr(Y  x) = : (2.4)
2.2. THE INCONSISTENCIES OF VAR 28
Then
Pr(Y  x) = Pr(L + b  x) = Pr(L  x  b) = ; (2.5)
which implies that x  b = V(L) (2.6)
and V(L+ b) = V(L) + b: (2.7)
Note that if a degenerate risk is added to the uncensored instead of the cen-
sored distribution and VaR is calculated, then VaR is not necessarily scalar additive.
To illustrate this point, consider the portfolio with loss distribution Q that always
produces a gain of b+1, Q =  (b+1) for some constant b > 0. This portfolio has a
negative loss with probability 1 and V(Q) = 0. As well, adding a degenerate risk of
b to the uncensored loss produces a portfolio with loss random variable Q+ b =  1
always produces a gain of 1, and V(Q+ b). Thus, for any arbitrary , V(Q) = 0,
and
V(Q+ b) = 0 6= V(Q) + b: (2.8)
It is simple to show that percentile-VaR is not necessarily mean value exceed-
ing (A2). Choosing  = 0, V0 is the minimum value of the loss distribution, which
is less than E[L] for any non-degenerate loss.
The failure of percentile-VaR to satisfy subadditivity or proportionality (prop-
erties A3 and A5) is illustrated in Examples 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 later in this chapter.
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The following three examples (Wirch, 1999) will be used to clarify how a per-
centile measure falls short of what is desirable in a risk measure. Example 2.2.1
shows how percentile-VaR is unable to dierentiate between a risk averse and a risk
taking portfolio. Example 2.2.2 shows that percentile-VaR is not proportional and
may inadequately order portfolios. Example 2.2.3 identies a portfolio for which
percentile-VaR is super-additive. In these examples we use the loss distributions
censored from below at 0.
Example 2.2.1 Let S0 be the initial price of a stock and let Sn be the price of
the stock n days later, where log(Sn)  Normal(log(S0); 2), and where  is
assumed to be a known constant.
Compare the following two portfolios:
Portfolio X:







0; Sn  S0
S0   Sn; Sn < S0
(2.11)
2.2. THE INCONSISTENCIES OF VAR 30
Portfolio Y:
Y0 = S0 (2.12)






































Both portfolios have the same initial value, and the same expected value at
time n. The maximal loss of each portfolio is S0; however, using the 95th percentile,
the VaR of portfolio Y is zero, and for portfolio X the percentile-VaR is positive
and equal to S0(1  e 1:645). The risk in Portfolio Y is isolated to a specic range
of outcomes for the stock price. This range of outcomes has a probability of less
than 5%, resulting in a percentile-VaR of zero. In portfolio X, the risk of a loss
is distributed over a much larger range and the probability of losing everything is
negligible. If we rely on percentile-VaR to compare these two portfolios, we would
choose Portfolio Y as the least risky; however, if we consider a person who is looking
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for nancial security, a 5% probability of losing everything is excessive.
Example 2.2.2 Let Z0 be the value of a risk factor today, and let Zn be the
random risk factor n days from now. Assume Zn has a Normal(0; 1) distribution.





0; jZnj   1(0:975)






0; jZnj   1(0:975)
100; jZnj >  1(0:975)
(2.17)
Both portfolios have losses over the same risk factor values, and both portfolios
have losses only in a region having less than a 5% probability of occurring. So both
portfolios have a V:95 of zero. However, in the region where there is a loss, the loss
for portfolio Y is ten times that of portfolio X. If we rely on VaR as a percentile
measure, to compare these two portfolios, we would be indierent between them
even though it is clear to see that Portfolio X is the investment with less risk.
Example 2.2.3 Assume that our only risk factor is the price of a stock in n days,
Sn, which has a Lognormal(; 
2) distribution, with  = 0:05 and  = 0:1 (see
gure 2.1). These parameters are appropriate for a 6 month (n = 180) duration.
Consider the following two portfolios:


























Loss for Portfolio A
Short Put, Strike=x5
x5
Figure 2.1: Loss Function for Portfolio A
Portfolio A is an n-day short put option with strike price F 1Sn (0:05) = x:05 (see
Figure 2.1 for the loss function of Portfolio A).
Portfolio B is a reverse buttery spread, consisting of ten short call options on
the same stock, ve with a strike price of x:05 and the other ve with a strike
price of F 1Sn (0:10) = x:10, and ten long call options on the stock, with a
strike price of x:10+x:05
2
. (See Figure 2.2 for loss function.)
The probability that the reverse buttery spread will produce a loss is 5%, and
the probability that the short put will produce a loss is 5%. Note that if portfolio
































Loss for Reverse Butterfly Spread
Figure 2.2: Loss Function for Portfolio B
A has a loss, then portfolio B will not have a loss and vice versa; the support of the
loss distributions is non-overlapping. Now consider the combined portfolio, A + B.
The cost of entering into these contracts is not taken into account because they are
sunk costs and do not aect the change in value of the portfolio between time 0
and time n. The regions of the distribution of Sn, for which A and B have losses
are disjoint. The combined portfolio now has a 10% probability of having a loss.
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This implies that the percentile-VaR value for the combined portfolio is positive,
V:95(A+B) > 0; (2.18)
and greater than the sum of the percentile-VaR measures for the individual port-
folios,
V:95(A+B) > V:95(A) + V:95(B): (2.19)
This example has shown that the percentile-VaR can be superadditive, and
thus the percentile denition of value-at-risk fails to adhere to the subadditivity
property(A5) of a coherent measure.
The potential hazard of percentile-VaR is not that it produces useless results
all the time, but that in using derivatives, it is possible to manipulate percentile-
VaR by isolating small segments of the joint risk distribution, and concentrating
the losses of a portfolio on one of these small-probability segments. In removing
the risk(losses) from other outcomes it is necessary to trade for additional risk on
the same small-probability segment. By increasing the size of the loss on that
segment, we can reduce the probability of the occurrence of a loss. In this way it is
possible to set any portfolio's percentile-VaR to zero or any other desired number.
This example is revisited in Section 3.3. Considering the above characteristic of
percentile-VaR, it is important to ensure that the risk measures used satisfy the
coherency requirements.
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Often in insurance, liabilities and assets are valued separately and truncated
data is often the most readily available for losses. Adding the risk measures or
using the truncated data risk measure, will overestimate the total risk when using
a sub-additive risk measure. However, this may still be useful to obtain an upper
bound on the estimate.
2.3 Improving the Current Risk Measures
Risk functions that utilize more information from the loss distribution tend to be
more dicult to implement or more computer intensive. It is very important to
consider the types of risks that these functions can identify, and how they would
improve upon the simpler models that lose much of the loss distribution information.
We have assumed that the distribution for the loss random variable holds as
much information as the user is capable of knowing. Sometimes a few characteristic
parameters fully dene this distribution. However, loss distributions for complex
portfolios rarely follow a simple distribution, and managers usually prefer to see
summary characteristics (statistics) of the distribution, rather than the distribution
itself.
There are three tools from statistics and actuarial science that will be dis-
cussed, which will help to produce a model that may overcome many of the limita-
tions of percentile-VaR: quantile distribution theory (Section 2.4), conditional tail
expectation (Section 2.5) and distortion functions (Chapter 3).
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2.4 Quantile Distribution Theory
(Embrechts, Kluppelberg and Mikosch, 1997) Right-tail risk analysis has proved to
be of considerable importance when comparing risks. Extremely large losses that
occur with very small probability tend to be overlooked by many nancial risk tools;
however, there exists extensive literature on right-tail losses relating to insurance
risk (Wang, 1998).
Percentile-VaR is an extreme value statistic (Bassi, Embrechts and Kafetzaki,
1997). As such, if it is to be used, it is important to understand the properties of
this type of statistic in order to improve our understanding of our percentile-VaR
results.
A denition of a p-percentile, xp of the distribution F (x) is:
xp = F
 1(p) = inffx 2 R;F (x)  pg: (2.20)
Based on an independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) random sample of n data
points, X1; :::;Xn, the empirical distribution of the random variable X is dened
as:
Fn(x) =
#fi : 1  i  n and Xi  xg
n
; x 2 R: (2.21)
Dening the order statistics for this distribution as
X(1) = min(X1; :::;Xn)  X(2)  :::  X(n) = max(X1; :::;Xn); (2.22)
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then xp can be estimated by
x̂p;n = F
 1
n (p) = X(k);
k
n
 p  k + 1
n
: (2.23)








where AN stands for asymptotically normal. Using this, we can obtain approximate
condence intervals for the estimated percentile.
As well, if X1; :::;Xn are i:i:d:, the binomial model for an order statistic can
be used to produce percentile condence intervals,








n r(1   p)r for i < j: (2.25)
The resulting condence intervals can help to identify the accuracy of a percentile-
VaR value.
2.5 Conditional Tail Expectation
One measure of right-tail risk, the conditional tail expectation, is similar to the
mean excess loss (MEL) (Bassi, Embrechts and Kafetzaki, 1997; Bowers et al.,
1997; Klugman, Panjer and Willmot, 1998),
e(x) = E[ X   x j X > x ] = E[ X j X > x ]  x; (2.26)
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which is the same as the Mean Residual Lifetime, or life expectancy, ex, used by
life actuaries. It is also the same as the expected loss given a loss occurs for the
reinsurer for a stop loss contract with attachment point x.
The Conditional Tail Expectation (CTE), conditioned at one tail value x, is
the expected loss taken over all losses in excess of x, where x is the lower bound of
the tail region being considered, referred to as the tail boundary value. Mathemat-
ically,
CTE (x) = E[ X j X > x ] = e(x) + x: (2.27)
The CTE evaluated at a specic tail boundary value does not hold much information
on its own; it is simply a conditional mean. However, as a function of the tail
boundary value, its shape can well describe the risk implied by the loss distribution.
A variation of the CTE is to dene the tail boundary by a percentile, V. This
CTE measure is also referred to as tail-VaR (Artzner, 1999), and is dened as the
expected value of the loss given that the loss falls in the upper (1   ) tail of the
distribution. In dening CTE, it is important to identify the case when V falls
in a probability mass, where
V = V+; for some  > 0:
In this case, we dene the conditional tail expectation function as:
CTE =
(1   0)E[ X j X > V ] + (0   )V
1    : (2.28)
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where 0 = maxf : V = Vg: (2.29)
Intuitively, for a given loss distribution, the CTE:95 would be enough on average
to cover a 1 in 20 event.
2.6 Two-Parameter Distributions
In order to illustrate the characteristics of the CTE, we apply the CTE to four
two-parameter distributions. The Pareto distribution was chosen for its heavy-tail
and nite number of moments. The second distribution chosen is the lognormal
distribution, which has tail that is not as heavy as the Pareto, and has many appli-
cations in nance. It is often used for stochastic stock price models. The gamma
distribution is chosen because it is a generalization of the exponential distribution
which has a constant failure rate, and the gamma distribution has a moderate sized
tail. Lastly the normal distribution is chosen for its simplicity and light tail, and it
is used as a standard approximation tool when discussing condence intervals and
value-at-risk techniques.
To set parameters for these distributions we used two methods. In our rst
comparison we matched the means, so that each distribution had a mean of 3.0, and
we matched the 95th percentile, so that each distribution had a 95th percentile of
10.415. The pdfs of these distributions are illustrated in Figure 2.3 and their ddfs
are illustrated in Figure 2.4. In our second comparison, we set parameters for the
distributions to match the rst two moments, using a mean of 3.0 and a variance of
45.0. The pdfs of these uncensored distributions are illustrated in Figure 2.5 and
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Figure 2.3: Two Parameter PDFs (Mean= 3 and 95%ile= 10:415)
For our rst comparison, using the distributions with equated mean and 95th
percentile, we illustrate how the CTE measures the risk for each loss distribution
by plotting the CTE(x) against x, the truncation value in Figure 2.7. This gure
illustrates the direct relation between the CTE and the tail of the distribution.
The heavier tailed Pareto and lognormal distributions are more steeply sloped and
have higher CTEs further out in the tail. The Pareto distribution has a constant
mean excess lifetime, which is linearly related to the CTE (see Equation 2.27), thus






















Figure 2.4: Two Parameter S(x) (Mean= 3 and 95%ile= 10:415)
the CTE for the Pareto is a straight line. At the 95th percentile, x = 10:41504,
there is a signicant dierence between the CTE values, where the heavier tailed
distributions have signicantly larger CTE values. From this graph, one can see
the expected severity of the excess risk caused by a heavier tailed distribution.
Plotting the CTE against the truncation value compares the distributions
based on the same truncation value, however for the heavy tailed distributions,
this gure does not illustrate the limit of the CTE as the truncation value tends
to innity, or the maximum of the distribution. In order to obtain a more com-









































































Figure 2.5: Two Parameter PDFs (Mean= 3 and Variance= 45)
prehensive view of the risk, Figure 2.8 illustrates the CTE over the full tail of the
distribution by plotting the CTE(x) against the tail boundary percentiles of the
distribution, F (x). In this gure we see a more signicant relation between the
CTE and the heaviness of the tail of the distribution, especially far out in the tail.
In both gures, the CTE at the 95th percentile, V:95 = 10:41504, can be compared
directly.
When analyzing the empirical distribution of any portfolio, a common ap-
proach is to calculate the rst few moments of the empirical distribution, and t






















Figure 2.6: Two Parameter S(x) (Mean= 3 and Variance= 45)
the empirical distribution to some known distributions by equating the moments.
For a second comparison of the two-parameter distributions, we parameterize the
distribution to have the same rst and second moments about the mean. In Figure
2.5, the four probability density functions are illustrated, each distribution has a
mean of 3 and a variance of 45.
Again, we illustrate how the CTE measures the risk in the distribution by
plotting the CTE(x) against x, the truncation value, for each distribution in Fig-
ure 2.9. From Figures 2.7 and 2.9 other than the normal distribution, the risk


























Figure 2.7: CTE vs. Tail Boundary Value (Mean= 3 and 95%ile= 10:415)
distributions with equated moments are more closely tted than the distributions
with equated 95th percentile. To see this, compare the range of the CTEs at a tail
boundary value of 10, the lines in Figure 2.7 have a range from 14 to 20 and are
diverging, whereas the lines in Figure 2.9 have a range from 18 to 22 and do not
start to diverge until the tail boundary value is 12. This suggests that comparing
the risk in a distributions based on a percentile is not as informative as using the
moment approach. This is supported by the fact that a percentile is one number
obtained from one point on a distribution, whereas a moment of the distribution is
























                                
Figure 2.8: CTE vs. Tail Boundary Percentile (Mean= 3 and 95%ile= 10:415)
one number but the whole distribution is used to calculate it.
In Figure 2.10, the ordering of the CTEs in the far right tail is consistent with
our intuition based on second order stochastic dominance. However, the CTE does
not consistently order the risks independently of the percentile chosen; the gamma
and the lognormal distributions seem to be more risky than the Pareto unless
a percentile greater than 98% is used. In the extreme tail of the distributions,
the Pareto distribution, which has the fattest tail, has the highest CTE values. In
Chapter 4, the CTE is shown to rank distributions inconsistently with second order


























Figure 2.9: CTE vs. Tail Boundary Value (Mean= 3 and Variance= 45)
stochastic dominance. The extreme tail is illustrated by plotting the CTE against
the tail boundary percentile in Figures 2.10 and 2.11. Comparing the gures,
using tail boundary value and tail boundary percentile for this illustration, is not
as transparent, since the 95th percentiles are not equal.





























Figure 2.10: CTE vs. Tail Boundary Percentile (Mean= 3 and Variance= 45)



































In this chapter we consider distorted risk measures, and show that VaR and the
CTE risk measures are special cases. We specify the coherent set of distorted risk
measures and discuss their properties. Two of these measures are considered in
more depth and applied to the examples from the Chapter 2.
Denition 3.0.1 A distortion function g : [0; 1]! [0; 1] is a non-decreasing func-
tion with g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1.
Function g is a concave distortion function if for all a; b 2 [0; 1] such that a < b,
and given any arbitrary  2 (0; 1),
g(a(1  ) + b)  g(a)(1   ) + g(b): (3.1)
A distorted probability  (Wang and Young, 1998) is dened on a -algebra 
 as
(A) = g[P (X 2 A)], where A 2 
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Given that FX is the distribution function of X, a non-negative random vari-


















Since X is a non-negative random variable, g(X)  Eg[X]. The distortion ef-
fectively changes the measure to allow for risk, sometimes called a risk adjusted
measure.
3.1 Properties of Distorted Risk Measures
Theorem 3.1.1 If g is a concave distortion function, and SX(x) = 1   FX(x),
then the distorted risk measure, g(X) is a coherent risk measure (Wang, 1996b).
Proof: Given concave distortion function g and an arbitrary riskX, to prove g(X)
is a coherent risk measure, we show that g(X) satises properties A1-A5.
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For A1: Bounded above by maximal loss.
Since g is an increasing function and g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1, then
g(S(x))  1 for x  max(X); (3.4)







1 dx = max(X) 2 (3.6)
For A2: Bounded below by expected loss.
Since g is an increasing concave function of S(x),







g(SX(x)) dx = g(X) 2 (3.8)
For A3, A4: Scalar multiplicative and scalar additive.








) for u  b
(3.9)
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g(SX(t))dt = ag(X) + b 2 (3.11)
For A5: Subadditive. (Based on proof in Wang, 1995b)
First note that if g is increasing and concave, then for 0 < a < b and x > 0,
g(b+ x)  g(a+ x)  g(b)  g(a): (3.12)
For any arbitrary increasing concave distortion function g, we dene g(X) =R1
0
g(SX(x)) dx. Using mathematical induction for every g and related g,
we prove the result for arbitrary loss random variable V , and U a discrete
loss random variable taking values in f0; :::; ng. By A4 the proof also holds
for U 2 fk; :::; n + kg and by A3 for U 2 fhk; :::; (n + k)hg; h > 0.
Any random variable can be approximated arbitrarily closely by a discrete
variable with small span h.
By mathematical induction:
(i) For n = 0; U0 = 0 almost surely, and (U0) = 0, so for any V
(V + U0) = (V ) + 0: (3.13)
(ii) For n;Un 2 f0; :::; ng, we assume that
(Un + V )  (Un) + (V ): (3.14)
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(iii) For n + 1: Consider (Un+1; V ) with Un+1 2 f0; 1; :::; n + 1g; and let
(U; V ) be distributed as (Un+1; V jUn+1 > 0). By (ii) and A4 the result holds
for U 2 f1; :::; n+ 1g. Thus
(U + V )  (U) + (V ): (3.15)
With !0 = Pr(U = 0) and SV j0(t) = Pr(V > tjU = 0), we have for t > 0
that
SU(t) = (1  !0)SU(t); (3.16)
SV (t) = !0SV j0(t) + (1   !0)SV (t); (3.17)
SU+V (t) = !0SV j0(t) + (1   !0)SU+V (t): (3.18)
This yields (according to Equation 3.12) for t > 0,
g[SU+V (t)]   g[SU(t)]  g[SV (t)]
= g[!0SV j0(t) + (1   !0)SU+V (t)] (3.19)
 g[(1  !0)SU(t)]  g[!0SV j0(t) + (1   !0)SV (t)]
 g[(1  !0)SU+V (t)] (3.20)
 g[(1  !0)SU(t)]  g[(1  !0)SV (t)] (3.21)
= g(1  !0)
(
g[(1   !0)SU+V (t)]
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Now dene h[S(t)] = g[(1 !0)S(t)]
g(1 !0)
, a new increasing concave distortion function,
and since g(1   !0) is a positive constant, integration over t on both sides
implies that the right hand side is less than zero by Equation 3.15, and this
yields
(U + V )  (U) + (V ): 2 (3.23)
It is interesting to note that, similar to risk averse utility functions, coherent dis-
tortion functions are increasing and concave, but distortion functions modify the
probability and keep the wealth function unchanged, whereas utility functions mod-
ify the wealth and keep the probability unchanged.
Theorem 3.1.2 All distorted risk measures with increasing, concave distortion
functions are layer additive (B4) and have an increasing relative risk load (B6)
(Wang, 1996b).




0 X < xi
X   xi xi  X < xi+1
xi+1  X xi+1  X
(3.24)
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g(SX(t))dt = g(X): (3.26)
For B6:













and substituting u = SX(x), which is a decreasing function of x, then
(x) =
g(u)  g(0)
u  0 as g(0) = 0 (3.29)
and since g is increasing concave, (x) is a decreasing function of SX(x), and
thus an increasing function of t. 2






 1 if g is concave
> 1 if g is strictly concave
= constant if g is linear
(3.30)
Theorem 3.1.3 All distorted risk measures with increasing, concave distortion
functions preserve FSD(C1).
Proof: C1. Let X FSD Y . Then SX(t)  SY (t) for all t  0. Since g is an
increasing, concave distortion function, then








which implies, g(X)  g(Y ): (3.33)
Theorem 3.1.4 All distorted risk measures with increasing, strictly concave dis-
tortion functions preserve ordering of dangerousness(C2) and SSD(C3).
Proof: C2, C3. Due to Proposition 1.4.1 (page 15) we only have to prove that the
increasing, strictly concave distortion risk measures preserve SSD with the
once crossing rule. (based on proof from Wang (1996c))
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Let E[X]  E[Y ], X SSD Y and let t0 be the once crossing point, so that
SX(t)  SY (t) for t < t0
SX(t)  SY (t) for t  t0
(3.34)
and since X SSD Y either
SX(t) < SY (t) for some t > t0 (3.35)
and/or SX(t) > SY (t) for some t < t0 (3.36)
Next, construct a new ddf,
SZ(t) = maxfSX(t); SY (t)g =
8><
>:
SX(t) t < t0
SY (t) t  t0
(3.37)
Since we have already shown that the distorted risk measures have increasing
relative risk loadings at upper layers,




[SY (t)  SX(t)]dt (3.38)
and




[SX(t)  SY (t)]dt (3.39)
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with at least one of the above inequalities being a strict inequality.
Subtracting the last two equations, we obtain




[SY (t)  SX(t)]dt  0 (3.40)
Thus, g(Y ) > g(X): 2 (3.41)
Corollary 3.1.1 All piece-wise linear distortion functions are coherent but do not
preserve SSD(C3).
Proof: The proof for the corollary parallels the proof of Theorem 3.1.4, however
over any linear portion of the distortion function g[SX(t)]
SX(t)
=M; a constant,
the slope of the linear portion.
For any risk X we can construct a risk Y such that E[X] = E[Y ] and X SSD
Y , and where t0, the once crossing point, is such that SX(t0) = SY (t0) = b and
g(b) lies on one linear portion of the distortion function. Also suppose that
the linear portion containing g(b) covers the range from g(a) to g(c) where
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= SX(t) for t  ta
= a for t = ta
 SX(t) for ta  t  tb
= b for t = tb
 SX(t) for tb  t  tc









[SY (t)  SX(t)]dt = 0: (3.44)
Constructing the same equations as in (3.38), (3.39), (3.40), we obtain




[SY (t)  SX(t)]dt (3.45)
and




[SX(t)  SY (t)]dt (3.46)
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which gives,
g(Y ) = g(X): (3.47)
That is, we construct a risk such that X SSD Y but g(Y ) = g(X): 2
Thus increasing concave distortion functions are coherent and increasing strictly
concave distortion functions are coherent and preserve second order stochastic dom-
inance.
3.2 Special Distortions
Using distorted probabilities, it is possible to derive a distortion function that
reproduces the CTE risk measure using Wang's premium principle (see Equation




1 if 1    < t  1;
t
1  if 0 < t < 1   :
(3.48)
Wang's distorted risk measure will replicate the CTE risk measure where q is
the tail boundary value. Since this distortion function is increasing and concave
(see Figure 3.1), and the portion of the loss distribution that we are concerned
with is the positive losses, the premium principle using this distortion function is
a member of the family of premium principles with concave distortion functions
and thus satises the properties of a coherent risk measure (see Denition 1.4.1).
However, since the CTE distortion function is piecewise linear and not strictly

















Distortion Functions for CTE(x)
x
Figure 3.1: Distortion Function for Conditional Tail Expectation Function
concave it need not preserve second order stochastic dominance. To illustrate this,
consider the expected value function which is a special case of the CTE (CTE0).
Using distorted probabilities, it is also possible to dene a distortion that will





1 if 1   < t  1;
0 if 0 < t < 1   :
(3.49)

















Distortion Functions for Percentile-VaR
x
Figure 3.2: Distortion Function for Percentile-VaR
In this case, the distortion function is a step function(see Figure 3.2), with
a discontinuity at 1   . Thus, this distortion function is not concave, and the
premium principle is not coherent. As we have already shown, VaR can be super-
additive, illustrating that VaR is not a coherent risk measure.
The set of all concave distortion functions denes a large class of premium
principles. There are some special cases of distortion functions that have intuitive
explanations. These are described below:
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Piecewise Linear Distortions: The CTE is an example of a piecewise linear
distortion. The CTE can be interpreted as the mean loss given that the loss
is greater than a specied value (discussed above). Piecewise linear distortion
divides the risk based on the linear segments, and multiplies the probability
of each subset by the slope of the linear segment. This assigns an outcome
more \probability" where the distortion is steep, and less when it is at.
The dual-power distortion: (Wang, 1996b) The function
gd(t) = 1  (1  t);   1 (3.50)




1   [1  SX(x)]dx; (3.51)
which can be interpreted as the expected value of the maximum of  observa-
tions. Using extreme value theory from Section 2.4, if Y1; Y2; :::; Y is a set of
 i:i:d: random variables with corresponding order statistics Y(1); Y(2); :::; Y(),







To obtain an approximation for the 95th or 99th percentile using the dual-
power risk measure, one could use  = 19 and  = 99 respectively.








 Proportional-Hazards (gamma=5)   
Dual-Power (kappa=5)    
                                                        
Figure 3.3: Proportional-Hazards and Dual-Power Distortion Functions
The proportional hazards (PH) distortion: (Wang, 1996a) The function
g(t) = t
1
 ;   1: (3.53)






dx;  > 1; (3.54)
which can be interpreted as a risk-adjusted risk measure, where  is the
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risk-averse index. Wang (1996a) shows how this resembles the risk neutral
valuation method in option pricing theory.
Of these risk measures only the PH-distortion principle has g0(0) =1 where
g0(0) is the upper bound for the relative loading at upper layers. Wang (1996a)
shows that in comparing a two-point risk and a Pareto risk with the same mean,
only the PH-distortion calculates the risk measure for the Pareto risk to be more
than the two point risk. Thus when g0(0) is nite, the relative risk loading does
not increase fast enough at the upper layers, as the relative risk loading is limited
by a function of g0(0).
Wang, Young and Panjer (1997) consider premium functionals. They use a
similar set of axioms to A1-A5, and add a sixth axiom called the Reduction of
Compound Bernoulli Risks which states:
Let X = IY be a compound Bernoulli risk, where the Bernoulli
frequency random variable I is independent of the loss severity random
variable Y = XjX > 0, and let  be the distortion function. Then the
market prices for risks X = IY and I(Y ) must be equal.
An equivalent condition for this property is that g(wq) = g(w)g(q) (Wang,
Young and Panjer, 1997), or that g is multiplicative (property B2). These six
axioms result in dening the market premium functional  uniquely as the propor-
tional hazard distortion risk measure.
The proportional hazard distortion functions are a special subclass of coherent
distortion functions that follow a larger set of properties and have proven useful
for insurance premium calculations. The PH-distortion applied to the survivor
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function S(x) is also known as the Lehmann family of survivor functions and is
related to proportional hazards models in statistics (Barlow and Proschan, 1965).
The application of the PH-distortions to premium principles has been considered
extensively in Wang (1996a) and Wang (1996c).
The subclass of premium principles that use PH-distortion functions preserves
all the same properties as the concave increasing distortion functions, however it
also satises the multiplicativity property(B2), which is equivalent to the compound
Bernoulli property from above and has a derivative of +1 at zero.
3.3 Illustrations
This section illustrates how the PH-distortion, dual-power distortion and the CTE
improve upon the percentile-VaR risk measure.
Often insurance data, or loss data, is recorded without the related data on
gains, or the probability of a gain. Example 3.3.1 identies why the censored distri-
bution is used, and the problems that would result if the full (uncensored) distribu-
tion or the truncated distribution were used. The next three Examples (3.3.2, 3.3.3
and 3.3.4) were used in section 2.2, to identify situations where percentile-VaR did
not adequately compare risks. The CTE, PH-distortion and dual-power distortion
risk measures are applied to these examples, and the results are discussed.
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Example 3.3.1 Let X, Y be discrete loss random variables dened by,
f(X = x) =
8>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>:
0:45; x =  10
0:32; x =  5
0:18; x = 0
0:04; x = 5
0:01; x = 10
(3.55)
and,
f(Y = y) =
8>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>:
0:71; y =  10
0:04; y =  5
0:0; y = 0
0:2; y = 5
0:05; y = 10:
(3.56)
A histogram for this example is shown in Figure 3.4. Using the full distribution,
the expected values for these distributions are the same :
E[X] = E[Y ] =  5:8: (3.57)
Considering the full distributions, the probability of having a loss in Y is 5
times greater than having a loss in X, however the gains in Y are also greater than
the gains in X. Thus the variance in Y is greater than the variance of X, but the
expected returns are the same. For second order stochastic dominance, comparing
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Figure 3.4: Histograms of Losses for Example 3.3.1













































X  =  Portfolio X
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Figure 3.5: Capital Requirements for Example 3.3.1 using Proportional-Hazards
and Dual-Power Distortions
less risky than Y , we compare ddfs.
1Z
x
SX(t)  SY (t)dt =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
0 for t   10
 1:3 + 0:26( 5   x) for   10 < x   5
 1:2  0:02(0   x) for   5 < x  0
 0:2  0:20(5   x) for 0 < x  5
0  0:04(10   x) for 5 < x  10
0 for 10 < x
(3.58)
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For any value of x, this integral is always negative, implying that risk Y
dominates risk X using second order stochastic dominance (SSD). Based on the
full distribution, any risk averse individual would prefer to invest in X. In terms of
VaR, V:9(X) = V:9(Y ) = 0, however V:95(X) = 0, which is less than V:95(Y ) = 10.
Comparing these two random variables, the expected value of the loss, given
that the loss is greater than zero, is the same for each risk. That is,
E[XjX > 0] = E[Y jY > 0] = 6:0: (3.59)
As well, if only the positive losses were recorded (in other words, if the loss
distribution is truncated at 0) then the two truncated loss distributions would be
the same:
fT (X = t) = fT (Y = t) =
8><
>:
:8; t = 5
:2; t = 10:
(3.60)
Using the truncated distribution, there is no dierence between these risks.
However, since we know the true full distribution of these risks, it is clear that any
risk measure must not be based solely on a truncated loss distribution.
If instead a censored distribution is used, where all gains are recorded as zero
losses, the censored distributions would be:
f(X = x) =
8>>>><
>>>>:
:95; x = 0
:04; x = 5
:01; x = 10
(3.61)
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f(Y = y) =
8>>>><
>>>>:
:75; y = 0
:2; y = 5
:05; y = 10:
(3.62)
and the expected, censored, losses would be:
E[max(0;X)] = 0:3 and E[max(0; Y )] = 1:5: (3.63)
Figure 3.5 applies the PH-distortion risk measure to the full distribution of
X and Y , the censored distribution, and the truncated distribution. The expected
value denition of the distortion risk measure (see Equation 3.3) is used in the full
distribution case, so that the integral of the distorted decumulative distribution
function would be over the entire real number line. This does not make sense, as
gains would add to the risk measure and the risk measure exceeds the maximum
loss. Thus, the full distribution should not be used in this way. For premium
calculations Wang (1999) uses a dierent distortion for gains, the dual-power dis-
tortion. However for the purpose of capital adequacy, the size of a possible gains
is not relevant when a loss occurs. The second graph in Figure 3.5 applies the
PH-distortion to the truncated distributions, and there is no dierence between
the risk measures for portfolio X and portfolio Y. Since the losses in each portfolio
are considerably dierent, this implies that the probability that a gain occurs is of
importance and that the truncated distribution should not be used. The third and
fourth graphs apply the PH-distortion and the dual-power distortion risk measures
to the censored data. These graphs order the risks in accordance with second order
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Risk Measure Parameter Portfolio X Portfolio Y
Dual-Power 19 3.98 8.09
99 8.12 9.97
Proportional Hazards 4 3.95 5.90
19 8.19 8.92
Table 3.1: Risk Measures for Example 3.3.1 using Censored Data
stochastic dominance, are bounded below by the expected loss, are bounded above
by the maximal loss and follow the properties of coherence. Thus for the rest of this
thesis, we consider only the censored distribution. Using the censored distribution,
Table 3.1 compares portfolio X and portfolio Y using some specic risk measures.
Using the censored distribution, it seems that the dual-power distortion is
more sensitive than the PH-distortion to changes in the probability of a loss occur-
ring. However, for the dual-power the ordering of portfolios in terms of riskiness
depends on the value of the parameter, as is shown in the next example.
Example 3.3.2 This example is a continuation of Example 2.2.1. The histograms
and decumulative distribution functions for portfolio X and Y are shown in Figures
3.6 and 3.7 respectively. Based on V:95, portfolio X is more risky. However, if we
consider a person who is looking for nancial security, a 5% probability of losing
everything may seem more risky. Based on a 95% quantile the CTE for portfolio
X is 1.246, and for portfolio Y is 2.689, which ranks the two portfolios in the same
order as the PH-distortion risk measure when the parameter is greater than 2, or
the dual-power risk measure when the parameter is over 8.
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Figure 3.6: Histograms of Losses for Example 3.3.2
Example 3.3.2 shows that the ordering of risk using the PH-distortion or
dual-power distortion may depend on the parameter chosen. The parameter relates
to a measure of risk aversion, so it is important to use the same parameter when






















































































































Figure 3.8: Capital Requirements for Example 3.3.2 using Proportional-Hazards
and Dual-Power Distortions
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Figure 3.9: Histograms of Losses for Example 3.3.3
Example 3.3.3 This example is described in Example 2.2.2. The histograms for
portfolio X and Y are shown in Figure 3.9. Both portfolios have a V:95 of zero,
which suggests that the two risks are equally risky, even though the potential loss
for portfolio Y is ten times that of portfolio X.
Based on a 95% quantile, the CTE for portfolio X is 4.950, and the CTE
for portfolio Y is 49.504. The PH-distortion and the dual-power distortion risk
measures also evaluate portfolio X as the less risky portfolio, independent of the




































































































Figure 3.11: SA(a), SB(b) and SA+B(c) for Example 3.3.4
Example 3.3.4 This example is described in Example 2.2.3. The decumulative
distribution functions for portfolio A and B and A+B are shown in Figure 3.11.
The probability that the reverse buttery spread will produce a loss is 5%, and
the probability that the short put will produce a loss is 5%. Note that the support of
the loss distributions is non-overlapping, and based on V:95, the combined portfolio
has a higher percentile-VaR than the two portfolios separately. This shows that
percentile-VaR can be superadditive, and thus the percentile denition of value-at-
risk fails to adhere to the subadditivity property(A4) of a consistent measure.
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Table 3.2 illustrates the capital required using the risk measure discussed
so far. The PH-distortion and the dual-power distortion risk measures maintain
the same ordering between portfolios A and B; and the comined portfolio has a
sub-additive capital requirement.
Portfolio: A B A+B
Mean 0.1796 0.2058 0.3854
Maximum 89.18 8.249 89.18
V:95 0.0 0.0 3.42
CTE:90 1.796 2.058 3.854
PH 19 23.29 6.693 23.57
DP 19 2.722 2.952 4.573
Table 3.2: Comparison of Risk Measures for Example 2.2.3
3.4 Comparison of Distortion Methods
In this section, we use the distortion functions discussed previously to compare
the same two parameter distributions that were used in section 2.6. For both the
PH-distortion and the dual-power distortion, the value of the parameter deter-
mines the risk aversion inherent in the risk measure. Figure 3.12 shows how the
PH-distortion compares the four distributions. For all values of the risk aversion
parameter, the PH-distortion consistently ranks the distributions, identifying the
Pareto distribution as the most risky, as expected.
Figure 3.13 compares the dual-power distortion for the same four distribu-
tions. In this gure, it is apparent that the ranking of the risks depends upon the
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Figure 3.12: Capital Requirements for Two-Parameter Distributions (Mean= 3 and
95%ile= 10:415) using Proportional-Hazards Distortion
value of the risk aversion parameter. When the parameter is large enough, the
order of risks is the same as the order seen when using the PH-distortion. However,
when using a small parameter, the Pareto distribution is shown to be the least
risky, which is the opposite of what would be expected for any risk averse person.
The CTE also indicates a change in risk ordering depending upon the percentile
chosen for truncation (see Figures 2.7 and 2.8).
The two-parameter distributions with the same mean and variance produce
similar results (see Figures 3.14, 3.15, 2.9 and 2.10); however, the dual-power risk
























Figure 3.13: Capital Requirements for Two-Parameter Distributions (Mean= 3 and
95%ile= 10:415) using Dual-Power Distortion
measure does not rank the Pareto distribution as the most risky until very far out
in the tail. The dual-power distortion risk measure for the gamma distribution
crosses the lognormal distribution and will cross the Pareto distributions for some
parameter value greater than 100.
This change in the ordering of risks has been postulated by Wang (1996b) to
be due to the nite bound on the relative risk aversion at upper limits when using
the dual-power distortion or the CTE distortion function. Unfortunately, Wang
(1996b) has also shown that although an innite bound of the relative risk aversion




















Figure 3.14: Capital Requirements for Two-Parameter Distributions (Mean= 3 and
Variance= 45) using Proportional-Hazards Distortion
is necessary, it is not sucient to ensure a consistent ranking of risks.






















Figure 3.15: Capital Requirements for Two-Parameter Distributions (Mean= 3 and
Variance= 45) using Dual-Power Distortion
Chapter 4
Features of the Beta Distortion
In this chapter, we recognize that both the PH-distortion and the dual-power dis-
tortion come from the beta family of distributions. Because of this generalization,
we consider the full class of beta distributions and nd a set of beta distortions
that is coherent. As well, we consider characteristics of these risk measures in order
to compare them with the current standards and identify appropriate parameter
values.
4.1 The Beta Distortion
The PH-distortion and the dual-power distortion, discussed in Chapter 3, are spe-
cial cases of the beta distortion function. Each of these distortion functions is an
incomplete beta function (Hogg and Klugman, 1984):
84
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a 1 (1   t)b 1 dt; (4.1)
= F(S(x)) (4.2)
where F(:) is the cdf of the Beta(a,b) distribution, and S(x) is the decumulative
distribution function, so that 0  S(x)  1, and (a; b) is the beta function with








a 1 (1   t)b 1 dt: (4.3)
To obtain the PH-distortion function, let a = 1























1 1 (1   t) 1 dt (4.6)
= 1  (1   S(x)): (4.7)
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a 1 (1  t)b 1 dt dx: (4.8)
for a > 0 and b > 0.
This risk measure is clearly dierentiable for any a > 0 and b > 0. In order
to limit the beta class of distortion functions to the subset that have the properties
we need for coherence, we apply the following theorem:
Theorem 4.1.1 The beta risk measure with parameters a and b is coherent if and
only if 0 < a  1 and b  1.
Proof: The beta distortion risk measures (see Denition 1.4.1) satisfy g(0) = 0
and g(1) = 1, since the beta distortions are beta distribution functions over
the interval [0; 1]. In addition, since a > 0 and b > 0, all beta distortion
functions are twice dierentiable all coherent beta risk measures can be found
by determining the parameters a and b such that
g
0
(p)  0; g00(p)  0; for all p; where 0  p  1: (4.9)
Since,  (a+b)
 (a) (b)







a 1 (1  p)b 1  0 for all 0  p  1; (4.10)
and all beta distortion functions are increasing.








(a 2) (1   p)(b 2)((a  1) + (2  a  b)p)  0 (4.11)





(a 2) (1  p)(b 2)  0; (4.12)
then the beta distortion function is concave if an only if
(a  1) + (2  a  b)p  0 for all 0  p  1: (4.13)
Splitting this into 3 cases we have
(a  1)  0 for p = 0; (4.14)
1  b  0 for p = 1; (4.15)
(a  1)(1  p) + (1  b)p  0 for 0 < p < 1: (4.16)
It is easy to see that for all a  1 and b  1, all three cases hold. So that the
beta distortion function is concave if a  1 and b  1.
To show that the beta distortion function is concave only if a  1 and b  1,
assume g00(p)  0 for any p. Then a  1 from setting p = 0.
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Also, g00(p)  0 if and only if
(a  1) + ( a  b+ 2)p  0 for any p
and for 0 < a  1, this is true if and only if
( b+ 1)  0 by setting p = 1:
Hence, g00(p)  0 for any p implies a  1 and b  1.
Thus any beta distortion risk measure, (X), is coherent if and only if
0 < a  1, 1  b  1: 2









a 1 (1   t)b 1 dt dx: (4.17)
where 0 < a  1, 1  b  1.
In order to compare the beta distortion with the PH-distortion and the dual-
power distortion, set a = 1












 1 (1  t) 1 dt; (4.18)
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Figure 4.1: Beta( 1

; ) Distortion functions
Some examples of the beta distortion of the survival function are demonstrated
in Figure 4.1. These graphs illustrate the eect of varying the parameters. The
rst graph demonstrates that higher values of the  parameter increase the initial
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gradient of the distortion, which corresponds to higher aversion to the far right tail
of the loss distribution. The second graph demonstrates that higher values of the
 parameter does little to aect the initial gradient, but increases the gradient for
the moderately extreme events, which corresponds to higher risk aversion overall.
Since all coherent distorted risk measures satisfy rst and second order stochas-
tic dominance and are comonotonic (B4 on page 12), then we may consider further
ordering properties for comparison of the beta distortion.
Denition 4.1.2 For risk measure  with parameter space 
, and arbitrary risks
X and Y , given some !0 2 
 assume (X(!0)) < (Y (!0)).
If (X(!))  (Y (!)) for every ! 2 
;
then  is dened as a consistent risk measure, and Y is said to dominate X in
-order.
For coherent beta distortions where  +  > 2, these measures order risks
consistently with second order stochastic dominance. When risks are not compa-
rable using second order stochastic dominance, the PH-distortion risk measure still
seems to consistently compare risks independently of the parameter.
Denition 4.1.3 For any risks X and Y , if P (X) < P (Y ) for any   1, then
we say that Y dominates X in PH-order.
If Y dominates X, we say that X is less risky than Y . If we assume that
4.1. THE BETA DISTORTION 91
the order of risks dened by the PH-distortion is what we want, and we call this
ordering PH-order, then the problem we would like to solve is this:

























 1 (1  t) 1 dt dy (4.20)
for all 0 < 1

 1 and 1  :
We already know that this is true for any risks X and Y where Y dominates
X with respect to second order stochastic dominance (which includes FSD, net
stop loss order, order of dangerousness); however, we have not been able to prove
that beta-order implies PH-order in general. Analyzing the beta distortion g(X)
for  6= 1, we have g0(0) = 1, and if 1 <  then g0(1) = 0, whereas when  = 1
(PH-distortion) g0(1) = 1

. The gradient of g(x) at x = 1 is less than one, and
determines the risk-adjusted probability allocated to minimal losses.
In chapter 3, we noted that the PH-distortion satises the multiplicativity
property (B2), which is equivalent to the compound Bernoulli property, and as
a result has a derivative of +1 at zero. The beta distortion does not satisfy
the multiplicativity property (B2) but is submultiplicative and also has an innite
derivative at zero as long as  is strictly greater than 1.
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The compound Bernoulli property is desired for premium evaluations. If there
is a transfer of risk between two parties, economic no arbitrage theory implies that
there should be no free lunch for either party. However, in calculating capital ad-
equacy margins, there is a dierence between the capital you should hold to cover
the frequency and severity risk and the capital you should hold to cover only the
frequency risk with a predetermined constant severity. Since the frequency and
severity risks are partially diversiable, pooling the risk should lead to a lower cap-
ital requirement. Thus a comparable axiom could be that the capital requirement
for risk (IY ) should be less than or equal to the capital requirement for the un-
pooled risk, (I(Y )). Using the same method as Wang (1997), distortion function
g must satisfy,
g(xy)  g(x)g(y); where 0  x; y  1: (4.21)
The functions g that satisfy this inequality are not as simple as in the case of
equality; however we consider the case of our beta distortion, g with   1 and
  1 and prove that these functions satisfy the submultiplicative property.
First we need to show that the beta distortion dominates the PH-distortion:
Proposition 4.1.1 Given   1 and   1, the beta distortion dominates the
PH-distortion for all x 2 (0; 1); that is g(x)  gP (x) for all x 2 (0; 1):
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Proof: In other words, we need to show that
g(x)  gP (x) for all x 2 (0; 1): (4.22)
When  = 1, we have that g(x) = gP (x) by denition, so assume  > 1.
We also have that gP (x) = x
1
 by denition. So consider the function
f(y) = g(y)  y
1
 : (4.23)
















which implies that d
dy









lies in the interval (0; 1) since ( 1

; )  , and d
dy
f(y)jy=1 =   1 . So, f(y)
does not have a root between 0 and 1, and f(y) > 0 for all y 2 (0; 1). Thus
g(y) > y
1
 for all y 2 (0; 1): 2
Proposition 4.1.2 Let X = IY be a compound Bernoulli risk, where the Bernoulli
frequency random variable I is independent of the loss severity random variable
Y = XjX > 0. Then the capital requirement for risk X = IY is less than or equal
to the capital requirement for risk I(Y ) for the beta distortion risk measure.
Proof: Based on the proof of Theorem 3 in Wang (1997), it is sucient to prove
that g, the beta distortion function with parameters 0 <
1

 1 and   1
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satises submultiplicativity. That is, we want to prove that
g(x) g(y)  g(xy); for all x; y 2 [0; 1]: (4.25)
For  = 1, g is the PH-distortion and the proof from Wang (1997) shows
that gP (x) gP (y) = gP (xy), so we consider the case for  > 1.
Since g(x) is a distortion function, we know that g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1.
As well, g(x) is a smooth continuous function, and the derivative exists for
all x 2 (0; 1). Since Equation 4.1 is symmetric in x and y, we choose any
arbitrary y in (0; 1), and consider the function
f(x) = g(x) g(y)  g(xy) (4.26)
f(x) = 0 when x = 0 or x = 1.
To show that there are no other roots of f(x), we prove that d
dx
f(x) has a
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Since g(y) > y
1
 and 1 > y, then x 2 (0; 1).




f(x) is positive, and since f(0) = 0, this proves
that f(x) is positive for all x 2 (0; 1).





(x)  yg0(xy) > 0; as x! 0+: (4.30)


































And so, we need to show that
g(y)
y
  y 1 1 > 0 for some y 2 (0; 1) (4.33)
4.1. THE BETA DISTORTION 96
or g(y) > y
1
 for some y 2 (0; 1) (4.34)
However, we know (see Proposition 4.1.1) that
g(y)  y
1
 for any y 2 (0; 1) (4.35)
for  < 1 and  > 1. So we have that
g(x) g(y)  g(xy); for all x; y 2 [0; 1]: 2 (4.36)
We have also illustrated that g satises (4.1) by drawing contour graphs for
g(x)g(y)   g(xy) over a range of parameters for all combinations of x and y. See
Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Contours of g(x)g(y)  g(xy) for Various Beta Distortion Functions
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4.2 Parameterizing the Beta Distortion
Although there are many parameter values that make the beta distortion risk mea-
sure coherent risk, there is no strict preference for choice of parameters. In this
section we use a uniform distribution for the risk and the von Mises and Kullback-
Leibler Information measures to compare the beta risk measures with percentile-
VaR and the CTE. Using these comparisons, it is possible to identify parameters
that are consistent with current regulatory standards.
4.2.1 Non-Informative Risk
In order to set parameters for the risk measures that are appropriate for many
applications in a variety of industries, we must not put too much emphasis on
extreme risk exposures. For applications that are concerned with these, an auditor
would most likely be involved with analyzing the risk and should identify it as an
extreme exposure.
To choose a portfolio to compare the risk measures is subjective. In order
to limit the subjectivity of choosing a risk distribution, we rely on the idea of





Entropy is a measure of the missing information needed on average to describe a
random variable (Cover and Thomas, 1991). Entropy only depends on the proba-
bilities of the random variable and not on the value of the random variable. The
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distribution f(x) that maximizes the entropy, is the one that is least subjective
with respect to the unknown information (Buchen and Kelly, 1996).
The distribution that maximizes entropy on a nite interval with no prior
information, is the uniform distribution. If the interval is innite, and the mean
is known, then the exponential distribution maximizes entropy. Since the maximal
loss is usually considered to be nite (the maximal loss before bankruptcy), the
uniform distribution maximizes entropy. Similarly, in Bayesian statistics, the uni-
form distribution is considered to be the most uninformative prior distribution, as
all outcomes are equally probable.
To compare parameters, each risk measure is applied to a risk with a uniform
distribution. Since the risk distribution is completely arbitrary, the uniform dis-
tribution gives the most general results; equating this solution with the regulatory
standard gives a method to compare the risk measures and determine parameters
for the beta risk measures.
Equating these risk measures when applied to a uniform loss distribution
is equivalent to equating the areas under the distortion graphs. If we set the
percentile-VaR parameter to  = 0:95, then the equivalent CTE parameter is  =
0:90. For the PH-distortion risk measure,  = 19, the dual power risk measure,  =
19, and the general beta risk measure could use any (; ), as long as  = 19. For
our purposes, we have chosen to use  =  =
p
19. Figure 4.3 shows the distortion
functions using these parameters. Using extreme value theory from Section 2.4, the
dual-power distortion with  = 19 gives a value approximately equal to E[Y(19)]
from a sample of size 20, which is also an estimate of the 95th percentile.
























Figure 4.3: Distortion Functions Applied to a Uniform Risk
Both percentile-VaR and the CTE ignore the shape of a large portion of the
risk distribution. They may identify some extreme exposures; however, portfolios
with the same extreme exposures may vary greatly in the shape of the rest of their
distributions, and should not be considered equal. The beta risk measures consider
the full distribution. The PH-distortion risk measure parameter  penalizes extreme
tail risks more heavily, whereas the dual-power risk measure parameter  penalizes
moderate risks more heavily. This will be more evident with the illustrations in the
next chapter.
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4.2.2 Relative Entropy
Using a topic closely linked to entropy, relative entropy (Cover and Thomas, 1991)
or the Kullback-Leibler(KL) information, we are able to dene a distance between
the distorted distribution and the original risk distribution. Relative entropy or the
KL information between two density functions is dened as follows:











The KL information can be interpreted as the expected information when the
distribution with density function h(:) is transformed into the distribution with
density function f(:).
Denition 4.2.2 The function M(:; :) is a metric on the set of real valued func-
tions 
, if for any arbitrary functions f , g, h 2 
, M(:; :) satises all of the
following:
1. Non-negative: M(f; h)  0;
2. Zero: M(f; h) = 0 if and only if f  h almost surely;
3. Symmetry: M(f; h) =M(h; f);
4. Triangle inequality: M(f; h) M(f; g) +M(g; h):
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The KL information measure is always non-negative. It is equal to zero when
f(x) = h(x), and additive for independent risks. However, it is not symmetric.
That is, I(f(x); h(x)) 6= I(h(x); f(x)), and thus I is not a metric, as the triangle
inequality does not hold. It is possible to create a metric form of this measure by
dening the metric information as
MI(f(x); h(x)) = I(f(x); h(x)) + I(h(x); f(x)): (4.39)
In most applications, relative entropy is minimized in order to nd the density
that is the closest to what is observed. The parameters  = 1 and  = 1 (in
Equation 4.18) minimize relative entropy. However, if minimized, the distortion
function would be a uniform distortion and our risk measure would be the expected
value of the risk. For capital adequacy, the objective is not entropy minimization.
Instead we use this distance to equate the parameters of the various distortions, for
an arbitrary loss distribution.
Let S(x) be the pdf of an arbitrary loss random variable X with pdf h(x),









0(S(x))h(x) log g0(S(x) dx; (4.40)
and I(f(x); h(x)) = EX [g
0(S(x)) log(g0(S(x))]: (4.41)
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where the expectation is taken with respect to the h(:) measure.
Applying the KL information to the PH-distortion we simplify and obtain:
IP (f(x); h(x)) =    log()  1; (4.42)
for the dual-power distortion:
ID(f(x); h(x)) =
1    +  log()
k
= log(k)  1 + 1
k
(4.43)
= IP (f(x); h(x)) (4.44)
with  = .
For the beta distortion:
















+    2)

where 	(z) = d
dz








In terms of the KL information, Table 4.1 compares the PH-distortion, the
dual-power distortion and the beta distortion information. Table 4.2 lists the pa-
rameters that give the same distance between the original loss distribution and the
distorted loss distribution.
Since this information measure is not a metric, we consider both the metric
form of the KL information, as well as the most common metric used in mathemat-
ics, the von Mises distance, or the L2 norm.
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Parameters Beta PH-Distortion Dual-Power
 
1 1 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 2 1.75 0.31 0.19
4 4 2.99 1.61 0.64
19 19 18.42 15.06 2.00p
19
p
19 3.39 1.89 0.70
Table 4.1: Kullback-Leibler Distances
Beta PH-Distortion Dual-Power
KL Distance      
0.765 2 2 4.730 1 1 2.792





19 70.28 1 1 6.212
Table 4.2: Parameters giving Equivalent Kullback-Leibler Distances
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The metric form of the KL information (MKL), is dened as,
MI(f(x); h(x)) = I(f(x); h(x)) + I(h(x); f(x)) (4.46)









h(x) log(g0(S(x)) dx (4.47)
where S(x) is the ddf, and h(x) is the pdf of the loss random variable X. Hence,
MI(f(x); h(x)) = EX [(g
0(S(x))  1) log(g0(S(x)))] : (4.48)
Applying the MKL information to the PH-distortion, simplies to




and for the dual-power distortion,




Thus, the metric form of the KL information introduces symmetry between the
dual-power and the PH-distortion. This symmetry is somewhat evident when the
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metric is applied to the beta distortion,
MI(f(x); h(x)) = (
1

  1)( ( 1

)   (+ 1

)) (4.51)






However, this symmetry is only on the boundaries of the parameter space, that is
for the cases when  = 1, or when  = 1.









The L2 norm, where f(x) is a dierence between two functions is often called
the von Mises distance. For two distributions, f(x) and h(x), with respective ddfs
of S(x) and S(x), the von Mises distance is dened as
W




From Equation 4.52, it can be seen that this distance is a metric, and measures the
distance between the distortion and the identity distortion. This measure is strictly
positive, symmetric and zero when S(x) = S(x). Since S(x) is a Uniform(0; 1)
random variable, the von Mises distance is independent of the loss distribution and
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The dual-power distortion and the PH-distortion with  = , are power func-
tions of the cumulative or decumulative distribution functions. These distortions
are symmetric in x+ y = 1.
Proposition 4.2.1 Given any p  1, the Lp norm for the dierence between
g(S(x)) and S(x) gives the same distance measure for the dual-power distortion
as for the PH-distortion when  = .
Here, both the dual-power and PH-distortion functions distort the survivor
distribution, but they focus the distortion on dierent parts of the distribution.
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Table 4.3 shows the von Mises and MKL distances for parameters  and  such
that  = 20. An interesting aspect of this table is that, when we transpose the
parameters so that  > , the von Mises and the MKL distances are both greater
than when  > . This dierence is very small; however this is counter-intuitive
for the measures we are using.
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Parameters Distance
  Von Mises MKL
1 20 0.2668 18.05
20 1 0.2668 18.05
5 4 0.2596 7.31
4 5 0.2598 7.38
10 2 0.2617 9.86
2 10 0.2624 10.17
Table 4.3: Von Mises and MKL Distances for Parameters  = 20
Beta PH Distortion Dual-Power
MKL Distance      
1.55 2 2 3.24 1 1 3.24
6.21 4 4 8.08 1 1 8.08
38.24 19 19 40.21 1 1 40.21
Von Mises Distance      
0.1065 2 2 3.85 1 1 3.85
0.2451 4 4 14.43 1 1 14.43
0.3281 19 19 286.36 1 1 286.36
Table 4.4: Parameters giving Equivalent von Mises and MKL Distances
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According to our objectives, we consider losses far out in the tail to be more
risky than medium sized losses; although the von Mises metric does suggest that
both parameters are equally important (see Table 4.4), the Kullback-Leibler dis-
tance gives us results that are much more intuitive for capital adequacy purposes.




















In selecting parameters for the beta distortion, we rely on the KL information.
Using  = 19 for the dual-power distortion would give an approximation for the
95th percentile. Using current regulatory standards, the current approach uses a 95
percent VaR, and then multiplies by three. The KL information for the dual-power
 = 19 measure is 2.00. By equating the distorted risk measures applied to a risk
with a uniform distribution, the equivalent parameter for the PH-distortion is  =
19, which is quite extreme when applied to practical examples. The KL information
for the PH-distortion with  = 19 is 15.06. The equivalent beta parameters, when
applied to a uniform risk, are  = 19. If we choose  =  =
p
19, the KL
information is 3.39, which is not that much higher than choosing  =  = 4 with
an information of 2.99. In calculating premiums, Wang suggests a PH-distortion
parameter of 2, which would have a KL information of 0.31, which is extremely low;
however the risks used in his applications are often diversiable. At this point, we
postulate that a beta distortion with parameters  =  = 4 seems appropriate for
capital adequacy purposes. These parameters will be tested in Chapter 5.
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4.3 Tail Behaviour Under Distortions
There are many ways of describing the tail behaviour of a distribution. Often in
actuarial science, we discuss distributions with increasing mean residual lifetimes
or decreasing failure rates. In statistics and nance, these are often referred to
as heavy-tailed distributions, or distributions with kurtosis higher than the nor-
mal distribution. In this chapter, we would like to classify these characteristics and
determine how the distortions methods aect these characteristics. To start, we de-
ne the tail measures that are currently used and discuss any associations between
them. Then we apply these measures to an unknown survival distribution and com-
pare this to the distorted survival distribution under the PH-distortion, dual-power
distortion and beta distortions, as well as the CTE and VaR distortions. Then, we
use the Weibull distribution, which can be heavy-tailed or light-tailed depending on
the parameters chosen, and see how these distortions aect the tail. Next, we see
that there are conclusions that translate to other families of distributions. Lastly,
we consider the four two-parameter distributions and apply some of these measures
to illustrate our observations.
4.3.1 Tail Measures
There are two functions that help to classify characteristics of the tail of a distribu-
tion. The rst is the Mean Excess Loss (MEL), also known as the Mean Residual
Lifetime (MRL) (Klugman, Panjer and Willmot, 1998):
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Denition 4.3.1 Given S(x), the ddf of a non-negative loss random variable X,













dt; as long as 0 < e(0) <1 exists. (4.65)
If the MRL is large for large values of x, then the expected loss for X   x is large,
and the distribution is heavy-tailed. The MRL is a linear transformation of the
CTE,
e(x) = E[X   xjX > x] = CTE(x)  x: (4.66)
The second function to help characterize the tail of a distribution is the failure
rate, also called the hazard rate or the force of mortality:
Denition 4.3.2 Given S(x) the ddf of loss random variable X, the failure rate
(x) is dened as:
(x) =   d
dx
log S(x): (4.67)






1  F (x); where f(x) is the pdf of x. (4.68)
In terms of a loss distribution, for small dx, (x)dx is the probability that the
loss is close to x, given that the loss is greater than or equal to x. If (x) is small
for large x, the loss is likely to be larger than x and the distribution is heavy-tailed.
If a distribution has a monotone decreasing failure rate (DFR) or a mono-
tone increasing mean residual lifetime (IMRL) then the distribution is said to have
a heavy tail. If a distribution has a monotone increasing failure rate (IFR) or a
monotone decreasing mean residual lifetime (DMRL) then the distribution is said
to have a light tail. If a distribution has monotone increasing failure rate (non-
decreasing), then it has a DMRL. As well, if distribution has monotone decreasing
failure rate (non-increasing), then it has an IMRL. Thus, monotone DFR implies
IMRL and monotone IFR implies DMRL; however the reverse is not implied (Klug-
man, Panjer and Willmot, 1998).







if the limits exist: (4.69)
It is possible for a distribution to have both an increasing and a decreasing
failure rate. The lognormal failure rate starts out at zero, increases to a maximum,
and then decreases to a limit of zero. The maximum failure rate is attained at a
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solution to






; where z =
log(x)  

; x  0 (4.70)
and N(:) is the Normal cdf.
It is also possible for a distribution to have either an increasing or a decreasing
failure rate, depending on the value of its parameters. The Weibull and Gamma
distributions are examples of this. As a special case, the exponential distribution
has constant failure rate, , and is considered to have both an increasing and a
decreasing failure rate. Table 4.5 illustrates some characteristics of the failure rate
for the Pareto, Lognormal, Weibull, Gamma and Normal distributions.
Another measure of the tail is the coecient of kurtosis (Hogg and Craig,





where  is the mean and  is the standard deviation of a random variable X. The
kurtosis of the normal distribution is 3. A fatter tailed distribution would have a
larger kurtosis.
To consider how distortion functions aect tail behaviour, the failure rate of
a loss is compared to the distorted failure rates. To start, we dene the survival
function under each of the ve distortions:








Lognormal (; ) 0 0 neither
Weibull (; )
0 ,  > 1


,  = 1
1 ,  < 1
1 ,  > 1


,  = 1
0 ,  < 1
IFR ,  > 1
constant ,  = 1
DFR ,  < 1
Gamma (; )
0 ,  > 1
1

,  = 1
1 ,  < 1
1

IFR ,  > 1
constant ,  = 1









Table 4.5: Failure Rate Analysis for Two-Parameter Distributions
Value-at-Risk:
SV (x) = gV (S(x)) =
8><
>:












SP (x) = gP (S(x)) = S(x)
1
 (4.74)
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Dual Power:
SD(x) = gD(S(x)) = 1  (1  S(x)) (4.75)
Beta:











(1   t)dt (4.76)
In terms of the failure rate, (x), the distorted failure rates are:
Value-at-Risk:
V (x) =   d
dx
log SV (x) =
8><
>:













P (x) =   d
dx









1  F (x) (4.80)
4.3. TAIL BEHAVIOUR UNDER DISTORTIONS 117
Beta:
B(x) =   d
dx























 (1   S(x)) 1
S(x)
(x) (4.82)
Under the percentile-VaR distortion, there is no rate of change of the failure
rate. Under the CTE distortion, the failure rate in the tail is the same as the
original failure rate. Under the dual-power distortion, the failure rate gets smaller,
and the rate of change has the same sign in the tail; however, D(0) = 0, and for
DFR distributions, the distorted failure rate increases to a maximum, and then
decreases to the same limit as the original failure rate. For the PH-distortion, the
failure rate gets smaller, and the rate of change has the same sign. Under the beta
distortion, the failure rate is smaller than the failure rate under the PH-distortion,
and the rate of change has the same sign in the tail; however, (0) = 0, and for
DFR distributions, the distorted failure rate increases to a maximum, bounded by
the PH-distorted rate, and then decreases to the same limit as the PH-distorted
failure rate. The maximum failure rate for the beta distortion failure rates depends
on the distribution of the underlying risk.
Using the PH-distortion, the failure rate is multiplied by a positive constant
1

. The derivative of the distorted failure rate maintains its same sign. Thus, a
distribution that had an IFR still has an IFR, only the failure rate is smaller and
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increasing at a slower rate, creating a risk loading for an IFR distribution. For a
DFR distribution, even though the derivative of the distorted failure rate decreases,
it remains negative, and the failure rate is proportionately smaller, creating a risk
loading for a DFR distribution.
Proposition 4.3.1 For any risk X, with ddf S(x) and failure rate (x), if X has
an increasing failure rate (IFR) in the tail, or
d
dx
(x) > 0 for some x, then there




Corollary 4.3.1 If X has a decreasing failure rate in the tail, or d
dx
(x) < 0 for




This indicates that the sign of the rate of change of the failure rate is preserved in
the tail, under coherent beta distortions.




the PH-distortion maintains the sign of the rate of change of the failure rate
of the original risk. Based on this, we show that the beta distorted failure
rate approaches the PH-distortion failure rate with the same slope as x!1.
By denition
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This also implies that
lim
x!1
[(x)  P (x)] = 0: (4.93)
Thus, the beta distorted failure rate approaches the same failure rate as the
PH-distortion with the same slope in the tail, and thus maintains the sign of










































e(x) if x > x
x   x+ e(x) otherwise
(4.97)

























1   (1  S(t))






























If the failure rate is monotone, then the direction of the rate of change in
the MRL is already known. Most of the distributions we consider have a monotone
increasing or a monotone decreasing failure rate, dependent on the parameters, and
since it is much more dicult to simplify the MRL under each of these transfor-
mations, we predominantly use results pertaining to the failure rate. However, if
(x) and e(x) are known, for some loss distribution X, then the rate of change of
the MRL is equal to,
d
dx
e(x) = (x)e(x)  1: (4.101)
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To compare the tails of two distributions, a simple comparison can be done by








0 =) X has a heavier tail
constant =) X;Y have proportionate tails
1 =) Y has a heavier tail
(4.102)
4.3.2 Weibull Tails































 (   1)x 2: (4.106)
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This implies that the Weibull distribution has an IFR for   1, and a DFR for
  1. This also implies that the Weibull distribution has a DMRL for   1, and an
IMRL for   1. The density and failure rate functions of two Weibull distributions
are illustrated in Figure 4.4. One distribution has light tails,  = 10 and kurtosis
= 3:5701, and the other has heavy tails  = 0:5 and kurtosis = 87:72. Figure 4.5
illustrates how the distortion functions distort the failure rates for the light-tailed
and heavy-tailed Weibull distributions. In the light-tailed example, the original
distribution has an IFR, and all of the distorted failure rates are also increasing.
Comparing this with the heavy-tailed distribution, the original distribution has a
DFR. Under the PH-distortion, the distribution is still DFR; however for the dual
power and the beta distortions, the failure rate rst increases and then decreases.
The dual-power distorted failure rate approaches the original failure rate in the tail,
and the beta distorted failure rate approaches the PH-distorted failure rate.
The Weibull distribution is a two-parameter distribution. As such, we can
compare it to the four two-parameter distributions used in Chapter 2. If we choose
 = 0:802412 and  = 2:653522, the Weibull distribution has a mean of 3 and a
95th percentile of 10.415.
Table 4.6 compares some of the characteristics of each of these distributions.
The Pareto, Weibull and Gamma have monotone decreasing failure rates, and thus
also have IMRLs. The lognormal distribution has an increasing then a decreasing
failure rate, and the normal distribution has a monotone increasing failure rate.
The distorted failure rates for the Pareto and lognormal distributions are












































Figure 4.4: Weibull Density and Failure Rate Functions
illustrated in Figure 4.6 and for the normal and gamma distributions in Figure 4.7.
If  = 0:5 and  = 1:5, the Weibull distribution has a mean of 3 and a variance
of 45 and can be compared to the four two-parameter distributions with equated
mean and variance. Table 4.7 compares some of the characteristics of each of these
distributions.
From Table 4.7, we see that the normal distribution has a kurtosis independent
of its parameters. The kurtosis for the Pareto distribution does not exist, as the
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Distribution Kurtosis (0) lim
x!1
(x) FR
Pareto  = 2:5  = 4:5 1 0.556 0 DFR
Lognormal  = 0:403  = 1:180 437.6 0 0 neither
Weibull  = 0:803  = 2:654 15.61 1 0 DFR
Gamma  = 0:663  = 4:527 12.05 1 0.221 DFR
Normal  = 3  = 4:508 3.0 0.095 1 IFR
Table 4.6: Tail Statistics for Distributions with Mean=3, x95 = 10:415
Distribution Kurtosis (0) lim
x!1
(x) FR
Pareto  = 2:5  = 4:5 1 0.556 0 DFR
Lognormal  = 0:203  = 1:339 1834. 0 0 neither
Weibull  = 0:5  = 1:5 87.72 1 0 DFR
Gamma  = 0:2  = 15 33 1 0.067 DFR
Normal  = 3  = 6:708 3.0 0.080 1 IFR
Table 4.7: Tail Statistics for Distributions with Mean= 3, and Variance= 45
























































Figure 4.5: Distorted Failure Rates for Heavy and Light-Tailed Weibull Distribu-
tions
parameter  is less than 4. The other three distributions have signicantly larger
kurtosis than the distributions with equated 95th percentile, and the limit of the
failure rate for the gamma distribution is signicantly smaller. The direction of
the failure rates for the ve distributions is unchanged. The Pareto distribution is
identical to the one used in the previous illustration, and the distorted failure rates
for the Pareto can be seen in Figure 4.6. The distorted failure rates for the Weibull
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and lognormal distributions are illustrated in Figure 4.8 and for the normal and
gamma distributions in Figure 4.9.
Although the beta distortion transforms a DFR distribution into a distribu-
tion with increasing then decreasing failure rates, the tail of the distorted distribu-
tion maintains the decreasing failure rate and is still bounded by the failure rate of
the PH-distortion.
All the graphical illustrations in this section have used the parameters  =
 = 4. Choosing larger parameters would decrease the failure rate further. If
 <  the failure rates are closer to the PH-distortion failure rate curve, and the
maximum failure rate is increased. When  >  the failure rates are even smaller,
the maximum failure rate increases, and the failure rate in the tail still approaches
the PH-distorted failure rates.


























































Figure 4.6: Distorted Failure Rates for a Pareto and Lognormal Distributions with
x95 = 10:415



















































Figure 4.7: Distorted Failure Rates for a Gamma and Normal Distributions with
x95 = 10:415

























































Figure 4.8: Distorted Failure Rates for a Pareto and Lognormal Distributions with
Variance = 45






















































In this chapter, the ideas discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 are applied to problems
of topical interest that can contribute to our understanding of these risk measures
and their applications. In the rst illustration a capital requirement is determined
for a maturity guarantee. Maturity guarantees often arise in segregated funds as
an added option that limits the investor's risk. The second illustration calculates
the capital requirement for an annuity rate guarantee, which is often applied in
the UK to retirement benets. An annuity rate guarantee is an option to transfer
a lump sum benet into an annuity benet at a guaranteed rate. After analyzing
these portfolios separately, we combine them using dierent weighting schemes, and
discuss two simple methods for allocating risk capital requirements between the two
portfolios. Lastly, we revisit the maturity guarantee and consider the implications
hedging has on the capital requirement for the maturity guarantee.
To accurately value any of these portfolios, a model must be chosen for the
interest rate process, the mortality process, lapses, ination, fund accumulation,
132
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etc. In order to keep these illustrations simple and transparent, we have chosen to
model the fund accumulation process using the Wilkie model and the lognormal
distribution. Using the Wilkie model we also consider modeling the long-term
interest rate. Some fairly strong assumptions are made about mortality and lapse.
In practice, provisions must be made for risk factors not taken into account here.
These illustrations are kept fairly simple as they are meant only to demonstrate
the capital requirement risk measures considered in the previous chapters.
5.1 The Wilkie Model
In order to model interest rates and stock fund accumulation we have chosen to
use the Wilkie stochastic asset model (Wilkie, 1995). This model consists of four
discrete annual time series which provide annual values for the retail prices index
(a function of the instantaneous rate of ination), the index of gross equity div-
idends, the current running gross dividend yield, and the gross yield on consols
(equivalent to the long-term interest rates). This model integrates interest rates
with accumulation rates for equities. The most recent full Wilkie model now in-
cludes simulations for wage ination, short term interest rates, exchange rates and
property accumulation. This model has met with a great deal of support and is of-
ten used for applications in actuarial science. However, the Wilkie model has been
in the public domain since 1986 and has been subject to scrutiny. Some criticism
has been expressed over its appropriateness with respect to short-term forecasting
and the subjective decisions Wilkie made in developing the model (Huber, 1997).
For our purposes, we feel the Wilkie model is sucient. We are not exploring the
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adequacy of this specic model, but using this methodology for our illustrations.
As well, our illustrations involve assets with a maturity of 10 years or more, so the
short-term forecasting problems are not as relevant. The purpose of these illustra-
tions is to apply our risk measures to topical problems, to determine relationships
between portfolios, and to discuss methods for allocating capital.
The time series model was tted to Canadian data from 1923-1993 (Wilkie,
1995). The model is used to simulate time series using the following equations:
1. Retail Price Index, Q(t)
log(
Q(t)
Q(t  1)) = 0:034 + 0:64(log(
Q(t  1)
Q(t  2))  0:034) + 0:032Z1(t)
(5.1)
where I(t) = log( Q(t)
Q(t 1)) is the instantaneous rate of ination.
The instantaneous rate of ination for year t, I(t) is an autore-
gressive process and is calculated as the mean rate, 0.034, plus a
fraction, 0.64, of previous year's deviation from the mean plus a
random Normal(0; 0:0322) term, denoted by 0:032Z1(t).
2. An index of gross equity dividends, D(t)
log(
D(t)
D(t  1)) = 0:19DM(t) + 0:81 log(
Q(t)
Q(t  1)) + 0:001 (5.2)
  0:0209Z2(t  1)) + 0:0406Z3(t  1) + 0:07Z3(t))
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where, DM(t) = 0:26 log( Q(t)
Q(t 1)) + 0:74DM(t   1);
and Z3(t); Z3(t 1) and DM(t 1) are independent standard normal random
variables.
The change in the logarithm of the dividend index is equal to a
function of the current and past instantaneous rates of ination plus
the mean real dividend growth, 0:001, plus an inuence,  0:0209,
from last years random eect on dividend yield plus and inuence,
0:0406, from this years random eect on dividend yield plus a ran-
dom Normal(0; 0:072) term, denoted by 0:07Z3(t).
3. Gross dividend Yield, Y (t)
log(Y (t)) = 1:17 log(
Q(t)
Q(t  1)) + log(0:0375) + Y N(t) (5.3)
where, Y N(t) = 0:7Y N(t  1) + 0:19Z2(t);
and Z2(t) is an independent standard normal random variable.
The logarithm of the dividend yield is equal to its mean value
(log(0:0375)) plus an adjustment (1.17) from last year's ination,
plus an inuence (0.7) from all the previous random eects on
dividend yield plus a random Normal(0; 0:192) term, denoted by
0:19Z2(t).
From the dividend index and the dividend yield, we can obtain a
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and an accumulation factor for the value of ordinary shares,
J(t  1) = P (t) +D(t)
P (t  1) : (5.5)
4. Gross yield on Consols (Long-term Interest Rates), C(t)
C(t) = CM(t) + 0:037exp(CN(t)) (5.6)
CM(t) = 0:04 log(
Q(t)
Q(t  1)) + (0:96)CM(t  1) (5.7)
CN(t) = 0:95CN(t   1) + 0:019Z2(t) + 0:185Z4(t); (5.8)
where Z4(t) is an independent standard normal random variable.
The long-term interest rate is calculated in two parts, the rst is
an allowance for expected future ination (CM(t)), and the second
is a real yield, where the logarithm of the real yield is equal to
its mean (log 0:037) plus a fraction (0.95) of its past random inu-
ences, plus an inuence (0.019) from the current random eect from
dividend yield plus a random Normal(0; 0:1852) term, denoted by
0:185Z4(t).
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The initial values required for these calculations are:
CM(0) = DM(0) = I(0) = 0:034 (5.9)
Y (0) = 0:0375e(0:03978) (5.10)
Q(0) = D(0) = J(0) = 1:0 (5.11)
CN(0) = Y N(0) = 0:0 (5.12)
5.2 Maturity Guarantees for Segregated Funds
In a segregated fund, premiums are invested for the insured by the insurer in the
assets of the fund. A management charge is deducted from the fund each year,
and benets are paid out on death or on the maturity date. The death benet
and the maturity benet vary depending on the success of the fund. It is possible
that these benets will be less than the sum of the premiums invested. Adding a
maturity guarantee onto the segregated fund guarantees a minimum benet for the
insured, at an additional cost to the insurer. This cost is often oset by a higher
management charge. Our objective is to use risk measures to provide guidance
on the amount of capital required to support this segregated fund business. In
order to determine the capital needed to cover a maturity guarantee, we consider
four dierent maturity guarantees on single premium 10-year policies based on the
same segregated fund. The rst guarantees 75% of the premium with a 1% percent
management charge, the second guarantees 75% with a 2% management charge.
The third guarantees 100% of the premium with a 1% percent management charge,
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and the fourth guarantees 100% with a 2% management charge. Hardy (1998) and
Boyle and Hardy (1998) considered this problem using percentile-VaR to calculate
the reserve for the maturity guarantee.
The segregated fund policies are assumed to be single premium policies, pur-
chased at the same time and held to maturity, so that there are no intermediate
entrants, lapses or withdrawals. We also assume that there are no reinvestments at
maturity, so that the full cost of the guarantee is felt at the end of the tenth year.
The capital required is determined at this date and we discount using a risk free
instantaneous interest rate which determines the amount of capital invested today
in risk free assets so that it will accumulate to the amount of the required capital
at the end of 10 years. We also make the assumption that there is no mortality
risk. Mortality risk is partially diversiable. We assume that any undiversiable
mortality risk is funded by a portion of the management charge.
Intuitively, the 75% guarantee with a 1% management charge is the least likely
to exercise the maturity guarantee. If the segregated fund earns a zero return, and
the 1% management charge is deducted each year, the resulting fund is still more
than 90% of the original premium and the guarantee is not needed. Conversely, the
100% guarantee with a 2% management charge is the most likely to exercise the
maturity guarantee as the fund must earn more than 2% each year on average to
maintain its initial value.
Two models were used to determine the fund accumulation factors. The
rst model for the accumulation factors uses the Wilkie investment model with
parameters tted from Canadian data from Wilkie (1995), described in the previous
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section. Using the Wilkie model, the fund value at maturity was simulated 150,000
times. For each simulation if the simulated accumulated fund was less than the
original premium, the dierence between the original premium and the accumulated
fund is discounted using a constant instantaneous rate risk free of interest of 6% to
the beginning of the 10 year period, otherwise the cost of the maturity guarantee is
zero. Since our risk measures are scalar multiplicative (A3) discounting the cost of
the maturity guarantee before applying the risk measure is equivalent to applying














where m is the yearly management charge and n = 10. Using 150,000 simulations,
an empirical distribution function is obtained. The beta risk measure was applied
to this empirical distribution function to determine the capital requirements for the
risk.
The second method assumes a lognormal distribution for a one-year accu-
mulation function (1 + it), with parameters consistent with the Wilkie model
( = 0:081;  = 0:17). We also assume that the accumulation factors are inde-
pendent for each year. The accumulated value of the fund, less any management
charges m, has a lognormal distribution, so that (1 + i)n(1   m)n is distributed
lognormal(n(+ log(1  m)); n). The discounted loss random variable is
L
Logn
MG = [g   (1 + i)n(1  m)n]+e n() (5.14)
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where [x]+ = max(x; 0) and  is the risk free instantaneous interest rate. We
calculate the expected cost and use numerical integration to determine the capital
requirements for the risk, based on the beta risk measure. Figure 5.1 compares the
maturity guarantee loss distributions under the Wilkie and lognormal assumptions.
The similarity of these curves suggest that the lognormal closely approximates the
Wilkie simulation model for fund accumulation.
To illustrate this problem more carefully, consider a segregated fund for a
10-year single premium endowment policy with a 75% maturity guarantee. At the
end of the 10 years, the policy pays the market value of the segregated fund, as
long as it is worth at least 75% of the value of the insured's premiums. The loss
distribution for this guarantee is bounded, the maximum payout (loss) at maturity
in this case is 75% of the invested premiums, the minimum payout is 0. If the fund
value at maturity is only 65% of the premiums, the guarantee will be exercised and
the cost of the guarantee is 10% (75%-65%) of the invested premium. If the fund
value is in excess of 75% of invested premiums, the investor gets the full fund value
and the guarantee is not exercised.
In comparison, a 100% maturity guarantee on the same segregated fund has
a maximum payout at maturity of 100% of the invested premium, and there is
a greater probability of having a payout under this guarantee. It is obvious to
see that the 100% maturity guarantee carries a higher risk for the insurer than
the 75% guarantee. Conversely, the management charge on the segregated fund is
deducted yearly, and reduces the accumulated value of the fund. If the fund has
a 2% management charge, the average yearly accumulation rate on the fund must
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be more than 2.04% in order for the fund to maintain its initial investment. The
lower the management charge, the more likely the fund is to maintain its initial
investment, and the fund will have a lower probability of needing a payout under
the maturity guarantee. Thus the 100% maturity guarantee with a 2% management
charge is the most risky of the four combinations, while the 75% maturity guarantee
with a 1% management charge is the least risky.
To compare the other two maturity guarantees, we consider the accumulated
cost of the management charge and compare this with the guarantees. Assuming
no fund accumulations, a 2% management charge for each of the 10 years reduces
$1 of initial investment to $1(1 0:02)10 = $0:817. Since 81.7% is greater than 75%,
for a 75% maturity guarantee, the average accumulation rate can be less than zero
and no payout is required from the guarantee. A 1% management charge reduces
$1 of initial investment to $1(1   0:01)10 = $0:904. Since 90.4% is less than 100%,
for a 100% maturity guarantee, the average accumulation rate must be greater than
1 .01% for the accumulated fund to be greater than the initial investment. Thus
a 100% maturity guarantee with a 1% management charge is more risky than the
75% maturity guarantee with a 2% management charge. If the guarantee rates were
85% and 90% instead of 75% and 100% respectively, it would be more dicult to
compare these guarantees.
Using the Wilkie investment model to simulate interest rates over the 10 year
duration of the segregated fund, and a 6% risk free discount rate, the expected
value of the initial cost of the 100% maturity guarantee with a 2% management
charge is $1.44. The discounted value of the maximum loss is $54.88. For the 75%
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100% Maturity Guarantee 75% Maturity Guarantee
Mgmt. Charge: 2% 1% 2% 1%
Mean 1.437 0.938 0.295 0.175
Std. Dev. 4.707 3.769 1.784 1.348
Maximum 54.88 54.88 41.16 41.16
Kurtosis 19.13 29.18 67.43 110.8
DP 19 15.29 11.70 4.559 2.915
PH 19 34.52 32.98 22.46 21.17
PH 4 14.82 13.02 7.496 6.405
Beta(1
2
; 2) 9.143 7.299 3.452 2.613
Beta (1
4





19) 23.50 21.02 12.44 10.78
VaR 95% 12.27 7.713 0.000 0.000
VaR 99% 24.38 21.12 10.66 7.402
CTE 90% 13.72 9.373 2.953 1.752
CTE 95% 19.52 15.75 5.906 3.503
Table 5.1: $100, 10-Year, Maturity Guarantee Capital Requirements, using the
Wilkie Model
maturity guarantee with a 1% management charge the expected value of the initial
cost is $0.18 and the discounted value of the maximum loss is $41.16. Table 5.1
compares the risk measures discussed in the previous chapters, applied to all four
combinations of guarantees and management charges. Table 5.1 illustrates two of
the problems with VaR. Based on a 95% VaR, the 75% maturity guarantee does
not seem to have any risk even though the mean loss is greater than zero (negative
risk loading). As well, VaR 95% does not dierentiate between the segregated
fund with a 1% management charge and the fund with a 2% management charge
(superadditivity). Even though the 75% maturity guarantee is less risky than the
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100% guarantee, the 75% guarantee has a much higher kurtosis. The kurtosis of
each maturity guarantee is more easily compared when the mean of each portfolio
is equated. However, for censored distributions, the kurtosis of the distribution














Figure 5.1: Density Functions for the Discounted Loss of a $1 Maturity Guarantee
(2% Management Charge)
As seen in the previous chapter, there are many combinations of beta parame-
ters that can be used. Figure 5.2 shows the eect of varying each parameter for the
100% maturity guarantee with a 2% management charge, whereas Figure 5.3 shows
the same eect for the 75% maturity guarantee with a 1% management charge.

















































Figure 5.2: Required Capital using the Beta Measures for 100% Guarantees with
2% Management Charge, Assuming Wilkie Investment Model
From these graphs, it is evident that the risk measure is more sensitive to changes
in the PH-distortion parameter . However, the dierence in risk between the 75%
maturity guarantee and the 100% maturity guarantee is very slight, and since these
liabilities are similar in nature, we consider the 100% maturity guarantee with a
2% management charge as our base maturity guarantee for the rest of this thesis.
The density of the Wilkie simulated maturity guarantee loss distribution,
censored at zero, is shown in Figure 5.1. The maturity guarantee loss distributions
are far from being normally distributed. Losses for the 100% maturity guarantees





















































Figure 5.3: Required Capital using the Beta Measures for 75% Guarantees with 1%
Management Charge, Assuming Wilkie Investment Model
occur with roughly 10% probability. For the 75% guarantee, losses occur with less
than a 5% probability. Losses, in all cases, have an upper bound, but using the
Wilkie model or any other reasonable model, it is practically impossible to reach
that upper bound. To compare our simulated solutions with a parametric model,
we assume that the underlying annual returns are independent and lognormal with
parameters that are consistent with the returns from the Wilkie model,  = 0:081
and  = 0:17. Since there is a closed form solution for the beta risk measure,
numerical integration instead of simulation is used to calculate the risk measure,
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and the results are shown in Table 5.2, for 100% and 75% maturity guarantees.
Again we see the same problems with 95% VaR, however all the other risk
measures rank the risks consistently. In all cases Beta(1
4
; 4) is larger than 95% VaR
and CTE 95%, and is larger than 99% VaR for the 75% maturity guarantee. Since




100% Maturity Guarantee 75% Maturity Guarantee
Mgmt. Charge: 2% 1% 2% 1%
Mean 1.538(5.037) 1.052 0.365 0.231
Maximum 54.88 54.88 41.16 41.16
DP 19 16.42 12.95 5.502 3.745
PH 19 38.59 37.49 26.56 25.69
PH 4 15.83 14.14 8.465 7.411
Beta(1
2
; 2) 9.782 8.010 4.002 3.137
Beta(1
4





19) 25.10 22.79 14.02 12.44
VaR 95% 13.25 8.800 0.000 0.000
VaR 99% 26.02 22.94 12.30 9.215
CTE 90% 14.76 11.25 3.652 2.30
CTE 95% 21.02 17.40 7.305 4.61
Table 5.2: $100, 10-Year, Maturity Guarantee Capital Requirements, using the
Lognormal Model
Figure 5.1 compares the densities of the maturity guarantee loss distribution
using the Wilkie and the lognormal models from 5.1 and 5.2.
The upper bound on the loss for the maturity guarantee, and the 5-10%
probability that a loss occurs illustrates how the beta risk measure determine the
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capital requirement for one type of portfolio. Thus we would like to compare this
illustration with another portfolio that has a larger probability of a loss and no
bound on the loss.
5.3 Annuity Rate Guarantees
Annuity rate guarantees were popular when interest rates were high, and thus an-
nuity rates were low. An annuity rate guarantee allows the policyholder to convert
their insurance policy or endowment benet into a life annuity at a prespecied rate
and a prespecied time. For instance, if a policy holder had a 10-year endowment
insurance, with an annuity rate guarantee of 9 at maturity; then for every 9 dollars
of endowment insurance that matures at the end of the 10th year, the policyholder







paid at the end of each month for as long as the policy holder lives. Again, if the
insured carried whole life insurance with an option to convert at the end of the 15th
year at an annuity rate of 8, then the accumulated value of the insurance at the
end of the 15th year, could be used to purchase a life annuity at a rate of 8 units
life insurance to 1 unit life annuity.
Unfortunately for the insurers, this product was used extensively in the UK
as a \free" option when interest rates were high. Since then, interest rates have
declined, life expectancy has increased, and the cost of this option is much greater
than originally anticipated, and the valuation of these liabilities has become very
topical in the UK. The value of an annuity rate guarantee depends on the accu-
mulated value of the insurance fund or the amount of the benet at the time of
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conversion, the interest rate at the time of conversion and beyond, as well as the
mortality rate of the cohorts purchasing this insurance. This guarantee often was
attached to retirement benets, whereby a lump sum retirement benet could be
transformed into a life annuity, where the age at conversion was approximately 65
and life expectancy at age 65 was roughly 15 years.
In this illustration we assume that the annuity rate guarantee is added to a 10-
year endowment insurance with a $1 single premium. The Wilkie investment model
used for maturity guarantees is used to simulate the insurance fund accumulation
rate, as well as the long-term interest rate at the end of the 10 years. This interest
rate is used to determine the present value of the annuity at conversion in 10 years,
which is then discounted 10 years at an instantaneous rate of 6%. In practice, each
insured could be from a dierent cohort with dierent expected lifetimes; however,
we have simplied this illustration by assuming that the life insured will live exactly
15 years after conversion instead of having a life expectancy of 15 years. Thus, a
15-year annuity certain is used to determine the present value of the converted
annuity.
In calculating the risk of an annuity rate guarantee, the rate of the guarantee is
determined at the inception date. At the conversion date the annuity rate guarantee
will be exercised if an annuity for the beneciary costs more than the guarantee rate.
Thus, the lower the guarantee rate, the higher the expected cost of the guarantee.
As well, the size of a loss is proportional to the size of the endowment fund. An
endowment fund with a 1% management charge will accumulate to more than a
fund with a 2% management charge. Thus, the risk associated with the annuity
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rate guarantee decreases as the management charge increases. The loss random















where Ag is the guaranteed annuity rate, and i12
12
= (1 + C(n))
1
12   1.
In order to identify the signicance of the risk pertaining to the fund accu-
mulation and the risk pertaining to the interest rate at the end of 10 years, this
same annuity rate guarantee is simulated using the Wilkie accumulation factors,
but using an assumed year 10 interest rate. This model is referred to as the Partial
Wilkie model. The long-term interest rate chosen, C(n) = 6.01%, gives the same
expected cost for the guarantee as the long-term interest rate from the complete
Wilkie investment simulation. Using this xed rate, the present value of a 15-year




AG = (1  m)n
nY
t=1
J(t)max [0; 9:705  Ag] e 0:06n: (5.16)
Figure 5.4 compares the loss density for the annuity rate guarantee using the Partial
Wilkie model (with an assumed annuity present value of 9.705) with the loss density
for the annuity rate guarantee using the simulated annuity present values from the
Wilkie model.
Comparing the Wilkie investment model assumptions with the Partial Wilkie
model, the dierences in the densities relate to the tenth year long-term interest

























Figure 5.4: Density Functions for the Discounted Loss of an Annuity Rate Guar-
antee
rate. In practice, an assumed rate may be chosen to maintain the value of a specic
risk measure other than the mean, in order to be more conservative.
The loss distribution using the complete Wilkie model is heavier tailed than
Partial Wilkie with an assumed tenth year interest rate (see Tables 5.3 and 5.4).
There is approximately half of the variability in the model when the tenth year
interest rate is assumed. Even though the assumed interest rate guarantees a loss,
the variability only relates to the accumulated size of the fund.
Using this same 10th year interest rate, we consider this problem using the
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2% Mgmt Charge 1% Mgmt Charge
Mean 0.749 0.829
Std. Dev. 0.806 0.892
Kurtosis 7.292 7.292
DP 19 2.688 2.975
PH 19 7.786 8.618
PH 4 3.005 3.326
Beta(1
2









VaR 95% 2.294 2.539
VaR 99% 3.413 3.778
CTE 90% 2.513 2.781
CTE 95% 3.001 3.322
Table 5.3: Annuity Rate Guarantee Capital Requirements, using the complete
Wilkie Model
lognormal assumption for the accumulation rate. Figure 5.4 compares the density of
the annuity rate guarantee using the lognormal assumption and the same 10th year
interest rate of 6.01%, with the Wilkie and Partial Wilkie models. The lognormal
assumption gives results between the full Wilkie and the Partial Wilkie model. For
the annuity rate guarantee, the lognormal model capital requirements are more
sensitive to changes in  than the Wilkie and Partial Wilkie models. This was not
the case when comparing the requirements for the maturity guarantee.
Comparing the annuity rate guarantee to the maturity guarantee based on
kurtosis, the loss distribution for the maturity guarantee seems to be much heavier
tailed. However, using the beta distortion, the heavier tailed the distribution,
the more sensitive the risk measure is to the rst beta parameter, . Using the
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2% Mgmt Charge 1% Mgmt Charge
Mean 0.749 0.829
Std. Dev. 0.387 0.429
Kurtosis 9.598 9.598
DP 19 1.691 1.872
PH 19 4.892 5.415
PH 4 1.966 2.176
Beta(1
2









VaR 95% 1.479 1.637
VaR 99% 2.063 2.283
CTE 90% 1.597 1.768
CTE 95% 1.850 2.048
Table 5.4: Annuity Rate Guarantee Capital Requirements, using the Partial Wilkie
Model (assumed 10th year interest rate)
lognormal model for the maturity guarantee, the PH-distortion with  = 19 gives
values 2 to 3 times the values given by the PH-distortion with  = 4. Whereas,
for the annuity rate guarantee with the lognormal assumption, the PH-distortion
with  = 19 gives values 7 to 8 times the values given by the PH-distortion with
 = 4. Under the Wilkie and Partial Wilkie models, the PH-distortion with  = 19
are only 2 to 3 times the values given by the PH-distortion with  = 4, for both
the annuity rate and maturity guarantees. Thus the lognormal assumption for the
accumulation rates, creates a heavy-tailed loss distribution for the annuity rate
guarantee which is not identied by the kurtosis. Thus the kurtosis may not be a
reliable indicator of heavy-tails for non-symmetric censored random variables.
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2% Mgmt Charge 1% Mgmt Charge
Mean 0.822 0.909
Std. Dev. 0.480 0.526
Kurtosis 10.57 9.930
DP 19 2.000 2.214
PH 19 18.87 20.88
PH 4 2.515 2.784
Beta(1
2









VaR 95% 1.722 1.907
VaR 99% 2.484 2.749
CTE 90% 1.879 2.079
CTE 95% 2.204 2.441
Table 5.5: Annuity Rate Guarantee Capital Requirements, using the Lognormal
Model
5.4 Combining Portfolios
When combining portfolios or subsidiaries, and calculating required capital for the
combined portfolio, one of the main problems is to determine how much of the
required capital should be held by each portfolio. The allocation of capital re-
quirements based on simple subjective methods can lead to a lot of controversy.
However, a more accurate division of capital requirements can lead to onerous cal-
culations. Thus we discuss two fairly simple methods of capital allocation; the rst
is marginal allocation and the second is a beta weighted allocation.
Marginal Capital Allocation: For measuring the risk of a nancial conglomer-
ate, where there is a large parent corporation and a number of small sub-
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sidiaries, one method to determine the allocation of the capital requirement
is to use marginal allocation. First the capital requirement is determined for
the parent corporation alone, then one subsidiary is added at a time, possibly
in ascending order in terms of size of their portfolios, and the capital require-
ment is recalculated for the combined portfolio. The capital requirement for
the subsidiary is the increase in the capital requirement when the subsidiary
is added. This method is repeated for each successive subsidiary.
To illustrate, let X be the risk portfolio for the parent corporation, and let
Y and Z be the risk portfolios for two subsidiaries. If (:) is the capital re-
quirement risk measure, then assuming (Y ) > (Z), the capital requirement
for the parent corporation is (X), the capital requirement for the subsidiary
with portfolio Y is (X + Y )   (X), and the capital requirement for the
subsidiary with portfolio Z is (X + Y + Z)  (X + Y ).
This method is obviously order dependent and puts heavier capital require-
ments on the risks in the parent company and the subsidiaries that are added
rst. The sum of all the capital requirements add to the combined require-
ment (X + Y + Z).
Weighted Capital Allocation: The second method values each portfolio indi-
vidually assuming some capital requirement measure (:), and also deter-
mines the capital requirement for the total combined portfolio. Then the
total capital requirement is divided up based on the weighting of their indi-
vidual measures.
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To illustrate using risk portfolios X1, X2 and X3, the combined portfolio has
capital requirement (X1 +X2 +X3). The individual portfolio risk measures




(X1) + (X2) + (X3)
(5.17)
where the sum of all the capital requirements adds to the combined require-
ment of (X1 +X2 +X3).
To illustrate the two methods of allocating capital requirements among sub-
portfolios, we combine the two portfolios used in the previous section. A maturity
guarantee is combined with an annuity rate guarantee, where the accumulation of
the underlying asset is based upon the same lognormal(0:081; 0:17) fund accumu-
lation model. Since maturity guarantees have a loss when the fund accumulation
is low, and annuity rate guarantees losses are proportional to the fund accumula-
tion factors, these products should provide some insight into combining negatively
correlated portfolios. We also assume that the annuity has a certain 15 year term
and is valued based on a constant year 10 long-term interest rate of 6.01%.
To start, consider a portfolio with a $1 initial investment in each fund. Using
a Beta(1
4
; 4) risk capital requirement from Table 5.6, the marginal capital allocation
method requires that the annuity rate guarantee portfolio hold the entire capital
requirement, 3.392. Using the proportional allocation method, the maturity guar-
antee portfolio requires 0.219 and the annuity rate guarantee portfolio would hold
3.173.
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Combined Maturity Guarantee Annuity Guarantee
Mean 0.837 0.015 0.822
Std. Dev. 0.460 0.050 0.480
Kurtosis 11.86 19.12 10.57
DP 19 2.000 0.164 2.000
PH 19 18.87 0.386 18.87
PH 4 2.519 0.158 2.515
Beta(1
2
; 2) 1.634 0.098 1.633
Beta(1
4





19) 3.748 0.251 3.748
VaR 95% 1.723 0.132 1.722
VaR 99% 2.484 0.260 2.484
CTE 90% 1.879 0.148 1.879
CTE 95% 2.204 0.210 2.204
Table 5.6: Combined Portfolio Capital Requirements, using the Lognormal Model
Since both funds accumulate, but only the annuity rate guarantee liability
increases with the size of the fund, assuming a $1 initial investment in each fund
leads to a much higher risk in the annuity rate guarantee than in the maturity
guarantee. This is illustrated in Figure 5.5 which shows the densities for each
portfolio and the density for the combined portfolio. In this example the annuity
rate guarantee dominates the portfolio and has a much higher capital requirement;
however, the proportional allocation method seems more fair than the marginal
allocation method. Figure 5.6 illustrates the failure rates for the two portfolios.
Both portfolios are heavy tailed, but the annuity rate guarantee has a much stronger
inuence on the combined portfolio.
To obtain a more illustrative comparison of the two portfolios, consider a
large portfolio of maturity guarantees, so that the mean loss of the maturity guar-

















Figure 5.5: Combined Density Function (2% Management Charge), Assuming Log-
normal Investment Model
antee portfolio equals that of the annuity guarantee. In eect, for every $1 initially
invested in the annuity rate guarantee there is $53.4 invested in the maturity guar-
antees. Using a 2% management charge, the results are shown in Table 5.7, and
a comparison of the individual densities with the combined portfolio density is in
Figure 5.7.
In this mean equated portfolio, we have increased the size of the maturity
guarantee position 53.4 times, and the maturity guarantee position dominates the
portfolio. In terms of capital allocation, using the marginal allocation method with

























Figure 5.6: Failure Rates for the Combined Portfolio
expected loss to determine the order of inclusion, either portfolio could be added
rst. If the maturity guarantees portfolio is added rst, it would have to hold 12.52
in required capital and the annuity rate guarantee portfolio would require capital of
0.437. If the annuity rate guarantee portfolio is added rst, it would have 3.392 in
required capital and the maturity guarantees portfolio would hold 9.560. Using the
proportional allocation method the maturity guarantee portfolio would have 10.19
and the annuity rate guarantee portfolio would have 2.762.

















Figure 5.7: Mean Equated Combined Density (2% Management Charge), Assuming
Lognormal Investment Model
To consider another weighting scheme, we equate the 95% VaR. In this case,
for every $1 initially invested in the annuity rate guarantee, invest $13.0 in the
maturity guarantees. The results can be seen in Table 5.8, a comparison of the
individual densities with the combined portfolio density can be see in Figure 5.8,
and a comparison of their failure rates in Figure 5.9. In all these combined portfolio
analyses, Beta(1
4
; 4) is larger than 95% VaR and 95% CTE, and is often larger than
99% VaR.
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Combined Maturity Guarantee Annuity Guarantee
Mean 1.643 0.822 0.822
Std. Dev. 2.559 2.691 0.480
Kurtosis 19.29 19.12 10.57
DP 19 9.205 8.772 2.000
PH 19 26.80 20.62 18.87
PH 4 9.042 8.455 2.515
Beta(1
2
; 2) 5.981 5.226 1.633
Beta(1
4





19) 13.83 13.41 3.748
VaR 95% 7.372 7.077 1.722
VaR 99% 14.11 13.90 2.484
CTE 90% 8.200 7.887 1.879
CTE 95% 11.47 11.23 2.204
Table 5.7: Mean Equated Combined Portfolio Capital Requirements, using the
Lognormal Model
In terms of capital allocation, using marginal allocation, the annuity rate
guarantee portfolio would be added rst and have to hold 3.392, and the maturity
guarantee portfolio would have to hold 0.667. Using the proportional allocation
method, the annuity rate guarantee portfolio would have to hold 2.139 and the
maturity rate guarantee portfolio would have 1.920 in required capital.
Considering the two allocation strategies, the marginal allocation method
strongly favours smaller risks and does not allow the parent corporation any reduc-
tion in terms of capital requirements, for diversication through subsidiaries. The
proportional method of allocation of capital requirements allows for hedging or di-
versication through subsidiaries and is also independent of the order of inclusion,
thus it is the preferred approach.

















Figure 5.8: VaR Equated, Combined Density (2% Management Charge), Assuming
Lognormal Investment Model
5.5 Hedging Error for Maturity Guarantees
Hardy (1998) uses percentile VaR to study hedging and reserving of maturity guar-
antees for segregated funds. In this section we use some of the same methods
to model and hedge maturity guarantees, however we apply the beta distortion
risk measures to this problem. Since a hedge portfolio can have gains as well as
losses, the combination of the maturity guarantee and the hedge portfolio can not
be compared in the same way we compared maturity guarantees and annuity rate

























Figure 5.9: Smoothed Failure Rates for VaR Equated Combined Portfolio
guarantees. The losses for the maturity guarantee are directly oset by the gains
in the hedge fund. If the maturity guarantee risk is hedged, instead of having some
fairly large losses with less than a 10% probability, we will have paid a xed cost
for the hedge and have considerably reduced our risk.
To illustrate, the liability of a maturity guarantee is simply a put option, where the
payo is the maximum of zero and the guarantee amount minus the fund accumu-
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Combined Maturity Guarantee Annuity Guarantee
Mean 1.022 0.200 0.822
Std. Dev. 0.657 0.655 0.480
Kurtosis 10.34 19.12 10.57
DP 19 2.785 2.135 2.000
PH 19 19.15 5.018 18.87
PH 4 3.021 2.058 2.515
Beta(1
2
; 2) 2.119 1.272 1.633
Beta(1
4





19) 4.413 3.263 3.748
VaR 95% 2.375 1.723 1.722
VaR 99% 3.671 3.383 2.484
CTE 90% 2.601 1.920 1.879
CTE 95% 3.151 2.733 2.204
Table 5.8: VaR Equated Combined Portfolio Capital Requirements, using the Log-
normal Model
lation at the end of the guarantee.
L = max [0;K   S(T )] (5.18)
Thus during the accumulation period, the insurer can use the Black-Scholes option
pricing formula to determine the price of the guarantee as:












T   t (5.20)
and d2(t) = d1(t)  
p
T   t (5.21)
5.5. HEDGING ERROR FOR MATURITY GUARANTEES 164
The constant K is the guarantee per initial value of the fund S(0), r is the risk
free rate of return,  is the volatility of the yearly fund accumulation rate and
N(:) is the standard normal cumulative probability. The option matures at time T
and the Black-Scholes price is determined at time t. Using this formula, one can
easily hedge against the liability by investing in N( d2(t)) units of risk free bonds
maturing at time T and taking a short position in N( d1(t)) units of the asset. In
our case, the asset is the segregated fund, K = 100, S(0) = 100(1 0:02)T , T = 10,
 = 0:17 and r = 0:06.
The Black-Scholes hedging formula assumes continuous adjustments of the
hedge ratio. In practice this is neither ecient nor practical, due to transaction
costs. In our illustration we assume no transactions costs. If we assume monthly
or weekly hedge ratio adjustments, we can determine the initial price of the hedge,
and by simulating the fund value determine the adjustments required to rebalance
the hedge. In rebalancing the hedge, changes to the investments in bonds and in
short assets are needed, the net cost of an adjustment is the dierence between the
cost of the position that should be held at time t:
BSPPut(t; hedget) = Ke
 r(T t)
N( d2(t))  S(t)N( d1(t)) (5.22)
and the value at time t of the position taken at time t   1, that is N( d2(t  1))
units of the risk free bond and a short position of N( d1(t  1)) units of the asset,
which has a current time t value of
BSPPut(t; hedget 1) = Ke
 r(T t)
N( d2(t  1))  S(t)N( d1(t  1)): (5.23)
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To adjust the hedge portfolio, N( d2(t))   N( d2(t   1)) units of risk free
bonds are purchased and a short position is taken in N( d1(t))   N( d1(t   1))
units of the asset. The net cost is:
ADJPut(t) = Ke
 r(T t) [N( d2(t)) N( d2(t  1))]
 S(t) [N( d1(t)) N( d1(t  1))] : (5.24)
Any negative values of this adjustment can be viewed as a release of capital, which
can be used to fund positive values of the adjustment. The total hedging error is
the present value of the series of adjustments, and the risk inherent in the hedged
maturity guarantee is based on the distribution of the present value of these ad-
justments.
Using the Wilkie investment model, readjustments to the hedge only occur
yearly, since this model is designed as an annual model. A monthly or weekly
model similar to Wilkie's, if available, would have a dierent structure. In practice,
monthly, weekly or daily adjustments to the hedge portfolio are more appropriate
than yearly adjustments. Thus we rely on the lognormal distribution for the fund
accumulation factors. The parameters of the lognormal distribution,  = 0:081 and
 = 0:17 are the same as in the previous sections. For a 100% maturity guarantee
with a 2% management charge, the initial cost to hedge the maturity guarantee is
$2.58. Using this model, 100,000 simulations of the ten-year monthly, weekly and
daily accumulation processes are used to determine the distribution of the present
value of the hedging error. Table 5.9 shows an analysis of the hedging error, when
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Monthly Weekly Daily
MEAN 0.231 0.110 0.041
Std. Dev. 0.432 0.207 0.077
Uncensored Kurtosis 7.518 7.879 8.023
Censored Kurtosis 17.91 18.90 18.99
DP 19 1.437 0.685 0.257
PH 19 4.271 2.299 0.782
PH 4 1.645 0.825 0.301
Beta(1
2
; 2) 1.003 0.484 0.181
Beta(1
4





19) 2.576 1.302 0.472
VaR 95% 1.100 0.525 0.195
VaR 99% 2.038 0.973 0.365
CTE 90% 1.286 0.614 0.230
CTE 95% 1.691 0.805 0.301
Table 5.9: Hedging Error Capital Requirements, using the Lognormal Maturity
Guarantee
rebalancing occurs monthly, weekly, and daily. For all three rebalancing periods
the beta risk measure, Beta(1
4
; 4), is larger than 99% VaR and 95% CTE. These
numbers assume no transaction costs.
Figures 5.10 and 5.11 illustrate the density function for the uncensored and
censored hedging errors for a 100% maturity guarantee with a 2% management
charge, and Figure 5.12 shows the failure rates. The original capital requirement of
$23.43 is the amount the investor has to hold for the unhedged maturity guarantee.
There is more than a 90% probability that none of this capital will actually be
needed, since the maturity guarantee will not be exercised. However, if the maturity
guarantee is hedged, the cost of the hedge is $2.58, a xed cost, and the investor
















Figure 5.10: Density for Uncensored Hedging Errors of a Maturity Guarantee with
a 2% Management Charge, Assuming Lognormal Investment Model
will still have a capital requirement for the hedging error of up to $2.39 (monthly
hedging). The risk in the maturity guarantee has been traded for a certain payment
with a small residual risk.
This example illustrates how hedging risk can limit the capital required to
cover the risk in a portfolio. If the maturity guarantee and the hedge were parts
of two dierent portfolios, and the risk measure was applied separately to each
portfolio, the capital requirement would not account for their osetting nature.
Thus there is great advantage to using a holistic approach to measuring risk capital.














Figure 5.11: Density for Censored Hedging Errors for a Maturity Guarantee with
a 2% Management Charge, Assuming Lognormal Investment Model

























Figure 5.12: Smoothed Failure Rates for Maturity Guarantee Hedging Errors
Chapter 6
Review, Conclusions and Areas
for Further Research
6.1 Review and Conclusions
The main purposes of this dissertation have been (i) to illustrate the insuciency
of the value-at-risk methodology for determining capital requirements and (ii) to
provide a new coherent risk measure that can be applied to loss distributions in a
way that coincides with the underlying purpose for having capital requirements.
Coherent risk measures have properties that are consistent with popular ideas
of risk aversion, including rst and second stochastic dominance. Value-at-risk is
not a coherent risk measure, and fails three of the ve coherency requirements.
In contrast, all concave distorted risk measures are coherent. There is a distor-
tion function that replicates VaR, however it is not concave, and is not coherent.
The PH-transform and the dual power transform are two coherent distorted risk
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measures that have been introduced by Wang for applications in premium princi-
ples. Both the PH-transform and the dual power transform are members of the
beta family of distribution functions. We have shown that the beta distribution
function is a concave distortion function over a specic range of parameters, with
the PH-transform and the dual power transform as special cases. The Kullback-
Leibler mean information was used to compare parameters for the beta transform
with parameters for the PH-transform and the dual power transform. Using second
order stochastic dominance, we were able to prove that strictly concave distor-
tion functions preserve second order stochastic dominance whereas general concave
distortion functions only preserve this weakly. This leads to a preference for the
beta distorted risk measure over the CTE and all other piecewise linear concave
distortion functions.
Tail analysis was used to determine that the transformed failure rate in the
tail of the distribution became heavier tailed, but always maintained the increasing
or decreasing failure rate property. The Beta risk measures were applied to three
portfolios, a portfolio of maturity guarantees and a portfolio of annuity rate guar-
antees, and a combined portfolio of maturity and annuity rate guarantees. Even
though the maturity guarantees have an upper bound to the loss, the annuity rate
guarantee loss distribution has a lighter tail than the maturity guarantees. This is
evident by the kurtosis of the two portfolios, and from the comparison of the two
portfolios in the mean equated combined portfolio example. Using two techniques
for allocating risk capital, we illustrated how the Beta risk measure can be used to
determine the division of capital requirements among portfolios. Lastly, we consid-
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ered hedging a portfolio of maturity guarantees and illustrated how the required
capital would be reduced in these circumstances. Throughout these illustrations,
the Beta(1
4
; 4) risk measure provided a good estimate of the risk capital that should
be held for each portfolio.
6.2 Areas for Further Research
6.2.1 Censored vs. Uncensored Loss Distribution
Using a censored distribution leads to discrepancies between time zero pricing of
risks and time zero risk measure values. As well, for risk measures using the censored
loss distribution, the translation invariant property of coherency generally applies
only to the censored risk. In order to remove this discrepancy and to have the
translation invariant property apply to the uncensored risk, a method used by
Wang (1999) should be investigated. This method allows the loss random variable
to be negative (uncensored) and uses a dual distortion of g, g(u) = 1   g(1   u),
to transform the negative losses. In other words, for any risk X, with ddf SX(x),










If g is a concave distortion function, then g is a convex distortion function. For
the PH-transform g(x) = x
1
 , the dual distortion g(x) = 1   (1  x), is the dual
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(1   t) 1dt (6.2)









(1   t) 1 1t 1dt; (6.3)
which is also Beta. If  = , then g is Beta with inverted parameters. This
risk measure is aected by the size of the possible gains, and may have limited
application in capital adequacy, however there may be more appropriate application
for this risk measure in valuation and pricing aspects of insurance and nance.
6.2.2 Extreme Value Theory
We have used extreme value theory(Bassi, Embrechts and Kafetzaki, 1997) to help
with our understanding of percentile-VaR and the dual power risk measure, however
we have not considered the application of this theory to the general Beta risk
measure.
6.2.3 Dynamic Risk Measures
This dissertation considers single period risk measures. To generalize these risk
measures to the multiperiod case, properties of dynamic risk measures will have to
be investigated. Tan Wang (1999) develops a set of properties that are desirable
for dynamic risk measures which may help to suggest a method to generalize the
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beta risk measure.
6.2.4 Mixture Problems
Another desirable property that has not been incorporated in this thesis is that
a risk measure should have an extra risk loading for parameter uncertainty. This
does not lead to a contradiction of the subadditivity rule, but pertains to mixture
problems in insurance. The PH-distortion risk measures for  > 1 satisfy this
property (Wang, 1995a), which may be able to be extended to the Beta distortion
risk measures with  > 1 and  > 1. Applications of this property may include
risks with limited available history, or in modeling liquidity risk or credit risk.
6.2.5 Allocating Risk Capital Among Portfolios
The marginal and proportional methods for capital allocation among portfolios
were used in Chapter 5. Dening correlation structures between portfolios, or
subdividing portfolios into independent subportfolios, may facilitate this process.
As well, another method using conditional allocation could be incorporated based
on the following relation:
Let g(:) be any coherent risk measure, then for any censored risks X and Y
we have,
(X + Y )  g(X) + g(Y ) (6.4)
= EY [g(XjY )] + EX [g(Y jX)] (6.5)
= U [g(XjY )] + U [g(Y jX)] (6.6)
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where U is the Uniform distorted risk measure.
6.2.6 Allocating Risk Capital Among Risk Factors Within
One Portfolio
In this application, we are considering dividing the risk capital among risk factors.
Examples of risk factors already discussed are: the short-term interest rate, the
long-term interest rate, the fund accumulation rate, the ination rate, the mortality
rate, and the lapse rate. Once the relevant risk factors have been identied, we
would like to determine the size or amount of risk that relates to each risk factor.
To illustrate, given a portfolio X, let Q be a vector of risk factors, so that Q =
(q1; q2; :::; qk), using risk measure , we would like to divide the total risk capital
(X) into portions relating to the risk capital required due to the risk from each
risk factor, (X; qi), i = 1; :::; k. First we assume that the relevant risk factors
are independent and discuss how this eects capital allocation, then we introduce
dependence between the factors.
Independent Risk Factors
If risk factors are independent, then changes in one factor do not eect the value of
other factors, and the cumulative distribution of risk factors can be factored into a
product of their marginal distributions. Depending on the risk measure used and the
construction of the portfolio, having independent risk factors can lead to dierent
results. To illustrate, let Q be a vector of risk factors, so that Q = (q1; q2; :::; qk),
since the qi's are independent, the decumulative distribution function for Q can be
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factored, so that
FQ(X) = Fq1(X) Fq2(X)::: Fqk(X) (6.7)
If the portfolio can also be divided into subportfolios that only depend on one risk
factor, so that X = Xq1 + Xq2 + :::+Xqk , then by using an additive risk measure,
for example (X) = E[X], we would have


















= (X; q1) + (X; q2) + :::+ (X; qk) (6.11)






Examples of additive risk models:
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This is similar to the method suggested by the 1993 revision of the Basel Capital
Accord, where the four risk factors considered were interest rate risk, exchange rate
risk, commodity risk and equity risk, if these risks are assumed independent.
Example 6.2.2 The Analytical Method: The analytic model assumes that the






Using (X) = V ar(X) the variance, and using the assumption that the risk factors
are independent, let
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Additive models provide a natural algorithm to determine the relative importance
or the sensitivity of the portfolio to each risk factor, by comparing individual risk
measure values. The higher the risk measure value for an individual risk factor, the
higher the exposure and the relative importance of that risk factor. Non-additive
models are not as easily decomposed. Assuming that the risk factors are known to
be independent, in special cases a transformation can produce an additive model;
however this is generally not the case.
Dependent Risk Factors
A common technique used to compute a risk measure in practice is to use the sim-
ulation approach. Often it is assumed that the joint distribution of the risk factors
follows a multivariate normal model (Frees and Valdez, 1998). This facilitates the
calculation and analysis of the risk measure; however, it limits the risk measure
to only evaluating risk related to second order dependencies in risk factors. Risk
factors are each assumed to follow a normal distribution, and are related to other
risk factors only through a correlation factor. The risk related to the change in
price of a nancial investment could depend on an underlying risk factor through
the skewness or kurtosis of the distribution of the risk factor, or on the change in
volatility. As well, dependencies between risk factors may be insuciently modeled
by a correlation. Derivative securities often provide examples of the rst problem.
Using the multivariate normal assumption, only delta and gamma risks are evalu-
ated. Methods in nance that are used to value derivatives often consider the theta
and vega risks of a portfolio, the risk related to the change in price of the investment
with respect to time, and volatility. Using the simulation approach, it is possible to
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use any form for the joint density function, and more complex relationships between
risk factors can be implemented.
An alternative option to assuming multivariate normal risk factor distribu-
tions is to assume some relation between the marginal and joint risk factor distribu-
tions using a copula (Frees and Valdez, 1998). Preliminary investigations into this
area have identied that copulas are very useful in modeling dependence of random
variables. They provide relevant information about the dependence structure of a
multidimensional random vector. Thus copulas merit further attention and may
prove useful for our study of multiple sub-portfolios and for our study of portfo-
lios with multiple risk factors. Frees and Valdez (1998) illustrates two methods to
specify a family of copulas for bivariate data, however copulas for higher dimension
multivariate data are not always convenient to identify.
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